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No 6, June 1989

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[The following are translations of selected articles in the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

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Experts Polled on Foreign Policy

18030012a Moscow *SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 6, Jun 89 pp 3-17

[Article by Andrey Yuryevich Melvil, doctor of philosophical sciences, ISKAN laboratory chief, and Aleksandr Ivanovich Nikitin, candidate of historical sciences, senior scientific associate of ISKAN: "Soviet Experts on World Politics"]

[Text] What influence are restructuring and glasnost exerting on the foreign political and ideological views and ideas of the Soviet public, scholars, political figures, and representatives of the mass media? What is the range of opinions being formed today in the political consciousness of the Soviet society regarding key issues of international policy and security as well as relations between the USSR and the United States and between East and West?

These questions seem important because the formation and dissemination of the new political thinking are not a sudden change, an "insight," but a complex ideological, political, and psychological process. And the process is fairly long-term and has its own achievements and problems, internal logic and changing rates.

We have set as our task to study the views and ideas of Soviet international experts and the broad public concerning issues related to the prospects for Soviet-American relations and the insurance of security. This research is a part of an international scientific project being carried out by the Institute of the United States and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences in conjunction with Brown University (United States).

The new thinking requires study, adjustment, and development during the process of its formation. The Soviet political consciousness, which was formed during preceding decades, is characterized by heightened awareness of stereotypes in the perception of sociopolitical, including international, reality. An unjustifiably large place in the political culture of the society has been occupied by prepared formulas and evaluations which have been pumped out of official documents and statements into mass media communications and have become the one and only "prism" through which the mass consciousness can perceive and evaluate international events and processes.

Strictly speaking, one can even doubt whether any independent and developed foreign political consciousness existed within the framework of the political culture of the Soviet society until recently. At the mass level, with respect to the country's foreign policy and questions of security, there has been a prevalence of the formula "leadership to the more visible" and the idea that the public cannot and does not influence the process of the formation of foreign and military policy (which does not rule out, of course, the existence among some of the community of independent but publicly defended views and positions regarding this issues). It is no accident

that, now that the first open public opinion polls on foreign policy problems have been started, a much larger percentage of citizens of our country (than in other countries with similar polls) select from the questionnaires variants of the response "I do not know," "it is difficult to say," and "no opinion." Many people simply have not formulated **their own** judgments and opinions regarding the most important issues of international life and the insurance of security, since the nature of the political process and political culture in the country has not contributed to independence, but, on the contrary, has encouraged the utilization of suggested stereotypes and readymade evaluations.

As for the foreign political awareness of Soviet specialists and representatives of political-academic circles, although it has been much more developed than the mass consciousness, it has been characterized by a lack of alternative positions and assessments and by poor development of the art of political discussion and polemics on international issues.

Today the situation is changing. Many traditional and customary evaluations are being reinterpreted. We are seeing formed before our eyes a new political and ideological **spectrum** of positions regarding issues of international policy and security, which is typical of any developed political culture and any normal society.

How does one study this new spectrum? On which data can it be based? Which methods are to be used for analysis?

Soviet research, like American research that is being conducted in parallel by the Public Agenda Foundation organization, is being conducted in two stages. In the first stage an attempt was made to reveal the differences that actually existed and the spectrum of positions in the views of Soviet specialists, and also to determine the basic types of foreign political orientations existing in their consciousness. The mass opinion of the Soviet public regarding problems of USSR-United States relations is studied in the second stage. Research was conducted in the form of a questionnaire with subsequent computer processing of the results and the application of methods of so-called cluster analysis to reveal the most widespread types of political orientations. Two thorough (about 170 questions) questionnaires were developed in the spring of 1988, a trial and a basic one, which give an idea of the various possible viewpoints concerning the nature, character, and dynamics of Soviet-American relations, international security, tendencies in world development, the foreign political goals and interests of the USSR, and so forth. Then an anonymous selective poll was taken of 120 international experts, diplomats, scholars, journalists, military men, and representatives of public organizations.

Because of the relatively small sizes of the sampling the results of the poll are of a preliminary nature. They make it possible to assess more the general tendencies in the distribution of opinions than a strict percentage ratio. It

was possible to verify these basic tendencies in second stage of the research which has just been completed. And on the whole they were corroborated. More than 1,200 respondents participated in the second poll, i.e. 10 times more than in the first.

When forming the selection of experts questioned during the course of our research we tried to include among those them, first, sufficiently qualified specialists with experience; second, proponents of various views and orientations so as to represent a broad spectrum of political and ideological positions, from traditional to alternative ones; and, third, representatives of the majority of the main departments participating in developing and conducting Soviet foreign policy and providing information support for it, including experts who themselves actually participate in the political and consultative work in the Soviet-American area.

We were helped with developing the questions and conducting the polls by associates of the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and above all V. Marinov. After that the data we obtained were processed on a computer in the laboratory for applied information science of the Institute of the United States and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Why did we select as an object of research opinions mainly on questions of the development of Soviet-American relations? For a number of reasons. First of all, the ideological values and the foreign political views of those questioned are concentrated, as through a lens, in their positions concerning Soviet-American relations. But additionally Soviet-American relations themselves are now experiencing a special, transitional stage. The traditional old principles of these relations, built on confrontation and formed as a result of the Cold War, are ceasing to work (we shall hope that this is not temporary but rather that they have burned themselves out). The active search for new models of relations between these leading powers is proceeding from both sides. But this search is especially crucial for Soviet international experts since for the first time in many decades it is the USSR, the Soviet side, that is leading and setting the tone in its bilateral relations with the United States.

Taking into account what has been said, during the course of our research we made an attempt to gather together various opinions regarding various issues and to reveal a comprehensive scenario of the development of Soviet-American relations in the near future and the period up to the year 2000 as they are seen by various groups of specialists.

Erosion of Stereotypes

Let us note at the outset that the research showed that the zone of consensus in the assessment of Soviet foreign policy is much narrower than we had supposed when beginning the research. The poll produced quite a few

confirmations that the development of the foreign political consciousness of Soviet international experts is going through a special stage: In it, as in the individual consciousness of many of those questioned, there is a contradictory coexistence of two paradigms, two views on international reality, two sets of values and principles. Traditional ideas about the priority of the interests of socialism and the priority of class interests over any others are coming into conflict with the difficult and gradual recognition of the priority of general human interests and values over any national, class, or state interests. The conviction of the inevitability of confrontation between socialism and capitalism in all spheres, from military opposition to the ideological struggle, is running up against the idea of mutual and general security and the need to de-ideologize intergovernmental relations. The conviction that the existence of nuclear weapons in the USSR and the observance of parity are the most important guarantees of peace is getting on in a contradictory way with the recognition of the principle of reasonable sufficiency and the ideal of a nonnuclear world.

The recognition and dissemination of principles of the new thinking are certainly not proceeding without reservations, and the principles themselves are also interpreted in various ways. But it would be unrealistic and also counterproductive to rely on "decreed" introduction of the new thinking. The poll clearly confirmed that here we have a gradual, stage-by-stage erosion of a number of ideas and concepts typical of the old thinking and their replacement with new ones that are more in keeping with the times and reality.

At the same time it should be noted that since such polls concerning problematics of foreign and military policy were not conducted previously, there is actually no possibility of comparing data from various years or speaking about changes that are fixed in time: Who can guarantee that many of the evaluations "in the spirit of the new thinking" are being introduced and are appearing only today, and have not been in existence for a considerable amount of time? Therefore, strictly speaking, one must compare existing **stereotypes** (frequently deliberately created and sustained by propaganda) about what the Soviet people "unanimously support" in the areas of foreign and military policy and in the ideological sphere, on the one hand, and the data obtained concerning the actual distribution of opinions, on the other.

What, specifically, are the results that were obtained? In the first place the poll showed that there is (obviously, not having begun today but considerably earlier) an **active erosion of a number of traditional ideas and concepts that are typical of the old thinking** concerning the interests of the USSR and socialism and the general nature of relations with the United States. Thus a considerable majority (77 percent) did not agree with the thesis that "the main goal of Soviet foreign policy is the spread of socialism as a system on a world scale" and declared that the goal is to prevent a nuclear war. The

same majority of those questioned did not agree with the thesis that the "differences and contradictions between capitalist and socialist countries are so deep that cooperation between them can be only temporary and limited in nature."


The data from the poll (see Appendices) show that ideas about the future development of Soviet-American relations are associated by the specialists who were questioned more with cooperation in solving the problems which affect both sides equally than with the development of confrontational tendencies. In particular, attention should be paid to the fact that an appreciable majority of experts expressed disagreement with the judgment that "as long as American imperialism exists a stable peace is impossible." Thus they not only expressed conviction that it is possible to build a stable security system under conditions of coexistence, but called into question the traditional assessment according to which capitalism not only has been but in the future will continue to be a "generator of wars."

The poll demonstrated that the **foreign political views of experts on the whole have now shifted in the direction of nontraditional, alternative approaches to questions of security**. For example, a minority of experts think that military and technical means are most effective for insuring USSR security while 52 percent of those questioned prefer to rely on political means. Every tenth person questioned was in favor of strengthening security unilaterally while 41 percent were in favor of providing for mutual security of the USSR and the United States on the basis of bilateral agreements.

Special attention should be given to the **attitude that has developed toward parity in the nuclear sphere**: 73 percent of the specialists agreed with the assertion that there is no point in scrupulously maintaining parity of forces, and 46 percent of the respondents noted that "there is no need for the USSR to have as many arms as the United States." Such views diverge from the principle of equality and equal security which was unquestioningly accepted by the Soviet side even in the recent past. Here today we have a shift away from a kind of "cult of parity" toward the idea of **reasonable sufficiency**. Finally, considerable support has been given to the idea of changing over to **nonprovocative defense**: 62 percent consider it necessary to switch to this strategy on a mutual basis and 30 percent are in favor of changing over to it in any case, even unilaterally.


The **erosion of the "superpower" psychology** that is taking place is shown by the fact that 43 percent of those questioned (compared to 35 percent) see in the future a movement of Soviet-American relations to a less visible place in world politics. Ideas of the interconnection between socialism and capitalism, the USSR and the United States, and the **priority of general human interests** over any state or class interests are becoming more and more widespread. This is also shown by the responses given in Appendices 11-13.

The fairly significant divergence of opinions concerning questions of the justification or lack thereof for any special rights for the USSR and the United States (Appendix 12) is significant. Actually, the 59 percent of the experts who believe that the USSR and the United States should be granted no greater rights than any other other members of the world community express a real agreement with the thesis of the new thinking concerning the subordination of state interests to general human ones. And this is an even more committed position than the agreement expressed by 87 percent to subordinate allied commitments and relations ensuing from principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism to the priority of general human interests. For it is not difficult to note that in the latter case the respondents were "weighing" mainly the value of ideologically motivated alliances and were not taking into account their revaluation as a result of encroachment on USSR interests, while in the question concerning the rights of the great powers the respondents were expressing agreement or disagreement precisely with a reasonable limitation of the "freedom of maneuver" of the power itself.



Preferred ratio of armed forces of USSR and United States. A-parity; B-the USSR has no need to have as many arms as the United States; C-the USSR should be stronger than the United States

Significant philosophical changes in the direction of recognition of human interests and values are also shown by these data: Only 16 percent of those questioned agreed with the assertion that the observance of human rights in the USSR and the United States is a purely domestic affair and is not subject to criticism from other countries. Ninety-two percent held the opinion that human rights like human values cannot be a zone beyond



What should be given priority if the interests of international aid to progressive forces in certain cases are in contradiction to general human interests? A-interests of international aid should be taken into account first; B-it is necessary to rethink the principles of proletarian internationalism given priority to general human interests and values; C-it is difficult to say


criticism from other countries and peoples. This position fundamentally diverges from the traditional appeal during the seventies and the first half of the eighties for "nonintervention in internal affairs" in regard to the human rights question.

As for the recognition by a considerable number of specialists that bilateral Soviet-American relations in the future will recede to a less visible place in world politics (Appendix 14), as the responses to others questions show, the specialists are assuming that this will take place primarily as a result of a relatively larger share of problems of a global nature.


Another new tendency is the **departure from the ideologized perception of Soviet-American relations and international relations in general**. Forty-three percent of the specialists (compared to 34 percent) did not agree with the assertion that relations between the USSR and the United States would always be determined primarily by competition in the ideological and political areas. Responding to the question of what the dynamics of Soviet-American relations would be in the area of ideology, on 9 percent of those questioned expressed the

opinion that the ideological contradictions would be aggravated while 30 percent expect that the ideological contradictions would remain at the present level and 42 percent foresee a reduction of ideological differences (Appendix 15).

The process of de-ideologization of intergovernmental relations as Soviet international specialists see it is unambiguously manifested in the change in the criteria considered expedient for solving the problem of granting aid to other countries. Up to this point a decisive role has been assigned to ideological criteria: Aid was granted mainly to countries that had proclaimed a noncapitalist or a socialist path of development. Today only one-fourth of the experts consider it expedient to continue to be guided by this criterion; the number of specialists in favor of aid to the countries most in need, regardless of their political orientation, is greater by a factor of 1.5 (Appendix 18). But it is especially indicative that the largest number of specialists spoke in favor of a sharp reduction of the scale of foreign aid, thus expressing a concern about the shortage of resources for carrying out restructuring within the country and a dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the aid previously granted to



Will get worse	Will stay at present level	Will decrease	Will disappear
Ideological contradictions in Soviet-American relations in the future			



other countries. One cannot but note that this position, which explains and expresses certain public attitudes under the conditions of the aggravation of the country's domestic problems, stands in contradiction to a devotion to general human interests and values.

The poll that was taken revealed the **real difficulties and contradictions on the path to the introduction of elements of new thinking into the consciousness of the specialists**. Let us say directly: "Rumors about the death" of the old thinking are premature. As was noted above, we are faced with a contradictory coexistence of elements of the new and the old. At the same time it would be wrong to see backsliding behind any adherence to traditional assessments and approaches: Frequently this adherence is simply a consequence of the still insufficient development of many principles of the new thinking, which leads to a lack of desire on the part of the people to part with not altogether satisfactory but still familiar ideas until the new alternative is complete and all the details of it are worked out.

An example of this is the attitude toward the strategy of nuclear deterrence, which was subjected to fundamental criticism in the foreign political platform of the CPSU and the Soviet state and about which the majority who were questioned gave a critical response in one form or another. At the same time, with a different, indirect way of formulating the questions 56 percent of the specialists agreed that "the existence of nuclear weapons in the USSR contributes to maintaining peace" and 35 percent also recognized the existence of nuclear weapons in the West as a factor in peace (see Appendix 20).

It should be noted that in a number of cases a considerable number of experts regarded certain principles which are usually perceived as components of the new thinking as unrealistic, at least under current conditions. This was manifested especially clearly in the estimation of the desirability and feasibility of complete nuclear disarmament. Of those questioned 74 percent thought it necessary to completely eliminate nuclear weapons while only

45 percent considered it possible. Moreover, 27 percent of the experts did not believe in the possibility of a nonnuclear peace and another 28 percent were in doubt. And 17 percent of the experts did not consider complete elimination of nuclear weapons either possible or even desirable. And although the program for stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 has been proclaimed by the Soviet government to be a fundamental foreign political guideline, only 10 percent of those questioned think that this can be done during the indicated time period.

Finally, it is noteworthy that the specialists consider the **development of perestroika processes in the USSR to be closely linked to the change in Soviet-American relations**. Reforms in the Soviet society, changes in the foreign political priorities, and a more flexible approach to problems of security which are being introduced along with the spread of the new thinking, experts think, will continue in the future to lead to improvement and normalization of Soviet-American relations and on the whole will encounter a positive, interested reaction in the United States. But another thing is also of considerable importance. More than 70 percent of the experts assume that a failure of perestroika will lead to a deterioration of relations with the United States and, consequently, a worsening of the foreign political instability and danger of conflicts.

A Couple of Scenarios

Which views of the development of Soviet-American relations exist in the minds of international experts and which kinds of development of relations seem the most probable to various groups of experts? Using a computer we did a cluster analysis of the results of the poll of the specialists. The computer sorted the questionnaires according the selection of key parameters characterizing the possible scenarios and indicated several different stable and most frequently encountered combinations of responses to key questions. Of course the cluster analysis

method has its limits—it made it possible to select logical types of views of Soviet-American relations, "purged" of internal contradictions and misunderstandings that are always typical of the living human consciousness. All of them have one or another degree of currency and influence among specialists, but in political reality they are extremely rarely encountered in "pure" form: In the consciousness of a particular specialist the type of view they accept in principle is overgrown with a multitude of additional contradictory judgments and evaluations, and anyone's views can be typified by a combination of two or three different approaches to the prospects for Soviet-American relations. But still as a tool cluster analysis makes it possible to reveal, in a large mass of concrete data about the positions of each specialist with respect to a wide range of issues, the most widespread approaches to the perception of future relations between the USSR and the United States. We managed to discover six independent scenarios of the development of the relations between the powers. Here are brief descriptions of them.

Scenario 1. We have conventionally called it the "ideological" one. It is based to a fair degree on traditional ideological ideas about the nature of relations between opposing social systems, Soviet foreign political goals, and the dynamics of world development. Proponents of this scenario think that class and ideological factors, the opposition of ideologies, and the ideological struggle—all this will be decisive in Soviet-American relations in the future and that the goal of Soviet policy with respect to the United States should be a crowding out of American imperialism and a change in the alignment of forces in favor of socialism. But this has to do with ideological and political superiority, not military. Proponents of this scenario foresee a preservation of military parity in the future (possibly at a lower level) and do not think that nuclear disarmament will be achieved either by the year 2000 or by the year 2010.

Scenario 2. It can be called, again conventionally, the "superpower" scenario. Here the main point of reference is the realization of state geopolitical interests and not the ideological interests of socialism as a system. Propponents of this model and in favor, above all, of unilateral consolidation of the economic and political positions of the USSR so that it can subsequently enter into economic and scientific and technical competition in world markets. According to this scenario, the USSR and the United States will continue in the future to have special rights and a special status in the world community; the USSR will significantly reduce its gratis aid to socialist and developing countries; tension in Soviet-American relations will decrease as a result of partial de-ideologization, and they will become more like business competition than global ideological rivalry; the growth of the military, economic, and political might of the USSR will provide for national security—on the basis of agreements with the United States and in the event of failure of negotiations, unilaterally; nuclear weapons will not

disappear and mastering them will remain an important parameter of the international status of both the USSR and the United States.

Scenario 3—"competitive coexistence." It is based on the idea that the main goal of Soviet foreign policy is the prevention of the nuclear threat, on behalf of which it is necessary to reach compromises and agreements on arms reduction. USSR security will be provided as mutual security with the United States on the basis of strictly monitored bilateral agreements; while maintaining parity there will be a gradual reduction of the level of military opposition, although it would hardly be realistic to expect the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2010; competition in Soviet-American relations would shift from the area of arms to the political, economic, and scientific-technical spheres.

Scenario 4—comprehensive normalization of Soviet-American relations—presupposes that it will be possible to reduce the tension in our relations with the United States in all areas and to change over to extensive bilateral cooperation; the contradictions between socialism and capitalism will cease to be the determining factor in Soviet-American relations, which are perceived as a combination of elements of competition and cooperation with a gradual shift of the balance in the direction of cooperation. It is probable that by the year 2010 will be able to achieve a radical reduction of all nuclear weapons, and progress in the area of disarmament, in turn, will contribute to reducing the political mistrust and significant advancement in all other areas of Soviet-American relations. At the same time comprehensive normalization of Soviet-American relations will not mean providing for general security since third countries can be sources of threat.

Scenario 5—restructuring of international relations—presupposes a changeover to quite new principles of international relations and security that corresponds to the new thinking and the recognition of the priority of general human interests and the subordination of the interests of the USSR and the United States to the interests of the world community. The USSR, the United States, and other countries will no longer perceive one another in terms of threat and will jointly respond to the challenge of their common global problems that come from the outside. The counterposition of the political and ideological interests of socialism and capitalism will gradually give way to a recognition of the global interdependence in the modern world. A system of general security will be created, which includes international organs for monitoring the fulfillment of disarmament agreements and international armed forces for maintaining peace. Then the very question of maintaining parity will lose its meaning and reciprocal and unilateral measures will be taken for disarmament and there will be a changeover to nonprovoking defense.

Finally, **scenario 6—"The USSR concentrates on internal problems"**—presupposes that the USSR will unilaterally

reduce its foreign political commitments; it will concentrate its resources on internal development; it will halt gratis aid to socialist and developing countries; and the point of reference will be the slogan that socialism should influence through the power of example. Ideological motives will no longer determine the foreign political interests of the USSR. USSR security will be provided basically through a unilateral policy—by increasing its economic and defense potential. Strict maintenance of parity is not necessary here. Nuclear weapons will be retained as a basis for "minimal deterrence."

Strictly speaking, not a single one of these six scenarios can be called "correct" or "incorrect." Each of them reflects certain interests of the Soviet Union, corresponds to the most typical approaches to international problems that actually exist in Soviet political and academic circles, and represents the contours of one of the possible alternative political strategies.

Since these scenarios were basically compiled on a computer from the most frequently encountered combinations of answers to key questions on the questionnaires, it was inevitable that the views of specialists concerning various questions would differ. But still we have tried to reveal the approximate percentage of those questioned who had key positions of one scenario or another. Here, as is the case with any kind of typologization, certain of those questioned simultaneously supported key components of two or more scenarios. As a result, the opinions of Soviet international specialists were distributed in the following way: scenario 1—13 percent; scenario 2—14 percent; scenario 3—35 percent, scenario 4—28 percent, scenario 5—50 percent, and scenario 6—20 percent.

Moreover, in addition to these six alternative scenarios, in our research we also managed to reveal a number of common predictions and evaluations of the prospects for the development of Soviet-American relations that are shared by the absolute majority (80 percent and more) of the specialists who were questioned. These were the theses that the USSR and the United States will have more common and parallel interests and that the need to solve common problems (ecology, energy, terrorism, and so forth) will ultimately force them to limit their competition and expand cooperation; that the contradictions between capitalism and socialism will cease to be regarded as the decisive factor in Soviet-American relations; and that priority should be given to human interests and values.

The majority of experts who were questioned consider the quantitative ratio of armed forces of the USSR and the United States today is not and in the future will not be the decisive factor in their security. From the standpoint of importance, disarmament will continue to be sphere number one for Soviet-American cooperation. The next in importance is thought to be cooperation in solving global problems of mankind and then economic and scientific-technical cooperation.

The majority of those questioned are convinced that the success of perestroika in the USSR will on the whole evoke a positive reaction in the United States and will lead to improvement of Soviet-American relations. Here the absolute majority of specialists think that trade-economic, scientific-technical, and humanitarian ties with the United States must develop stably, regardless of the condition of their political relations in the future.

APPENDICES

	Agree, %	Disagree, %
1. Main goal of Soviet foreign policy		
To avoid nuclear war	77	6
To spread socialism as a system on a world scale	7	77
2. What are the causes of the rivalry between the USSR and the United States		
This rivalry is determined mainly by		
ideological contradictions between socialism and capitalism	64	22
the existence of already accumulated military arsenals and the inertia of the arms race	54	31
the battle for influence in the Third World	34	46
3. What determines the nature of Soviet-American relations		
The differences and contradictions between capitalist and socialist countries are so great that cooperation between them can only be temporary and limited	14	74
Relations between the USSR and the United States will be determined primarily by their rivalry in the ideological and political areas	34	43
As long as American imperialism exists a stable peace is impossible	20	64
The contradictions between socialism and capitalism should not be regarded as a determining factor in Soviet-American relations	81	15
The USSR and the United States are discovering more and more common and parallel interests	81	2
The need to solve common problems (ecology, energy, terrorism, and so forth) will ultimately force the USSR and the United States to limit rivalry and expand cooperation	76	7

4. How can USSR security be insured		
1) Which of the following variants of insuring USSR security do you consider to be the most acceptable?		%
Unilaterally (strengthening defense capability, economic power, political influence)		9
On the basis of agreements with the United States, providing for mutual security with them		41
On a broad international basis of multilateral agreements		50
2) What means do you consider the most effective for insuring USSR security (you may give several answers)?		
Military-technical		17
Economic		46
Political		52
3) Some people think that the process of disarmament that is now beginning can ultimately place the USSR in a more vulnerable position than the United States. Do you agree with this opinion?		%
Agree		11
Disagree		76
5. The nature of the threat		
1) Do you think an "American threat" exists?		%
It exists		43
It does not exist		33
It is difficult to say		24
2) If you answered yes to the preceding question, clarify, please, in which spheres it is manifested or can be manifested (you may give several answers).		
Economic and scientific-technical		52
Human sciences (culture, education, art, and so forth)		23
War		73
Ideological		44
6. The intentions of the Americans		
	Agree, %	Disagree, %
The United States has goals that can be reached by a nuclear attack on the USSR	11	80
The majority of American people, like Soviet people, want to reduce the threat and risk of nuclear war	98	0
The U.S. administration, like the Soviet side, wants to reduce the threat and risk of nuclear war	77	8
		Difficult to say, %
		15
7. Probability of nuclear conflict		
1) In your opinion, how probable it is that the United States can deliberately launch a nuclear attack on the USSR?		%
Probable		10
Not very probable		56
Quite improbable		26
Difficult to say		8
2) If there is a nuclear conflict between the USSR and the United States, which side might win		
United States		5
USSR		1
Neither the United States nor the USSR		78
Difficult to say		16
8. Disarmament is adequate		
	Agree, %	Disagree, %
The main thing is to achieve real progress in the area of disarmament; how relations with the United States develop in other areas (economics, humanities) is secondary	37	58
Progress in USSR-U.S. relations can only be comprehensive, simultaneous in all areas (arms reduction, economic, scientific-technical, cultural, and so forth) and cannot be limited to any single sphere	72	22

9. Relationship of military forces		Disagree, %	Agree, %	Difficult to say, %
1) What, in your estimation, will be the relationship of military forces of the USSR and the United States by the year 2000?				%
General parity at the present level				8
General parity at a higher level				10
General parity at a lower level				58
The United States will be stronger than the USSR				13
The USSR will be stronger than the United States				0
Difficult to say				11
2) What, in your opinion, should be the relationship of military forces between the USSR and the United States?				
The military might of the two countries should be equal				50
The USSR has no need to have the same quantity of arms as the United States				47
The USSR should be stronger than the United States				3
10. Nonprovocative defense		Disagree, %	Agree, %	Difficult to say, %
1) Should the USSR change over to nonprovocative defense (refrain from offensive weapons while retaining defensive ones)?				%
It should change over only on a reciprocal basis				62
It should change over in any case, even unilaterally				30
It should not change over at all				4
11. Priority of human interests		Disagree, %	Agree, %	Difficult to say, %
1) There is the thesis that human interests should have priority over any other values. To what extent, in your opinion, should this determine the USSR policy with respect to the United States?				%
To a large extent				68
To an average extent				19
To a small extent				2
Not at all				0
It is difficult for me to answer				11
2) Sometimes people express the opinion that the principle of priority of human interests over the interests of any states or classes can come into contradiction with the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism and impede the strengthening of the influence of socialism on the planet.				
The interests of international aid to progressive forces should always be taken into account first				8
It is necessary to revise the existing understanding of the role of socialism and the principles of proletarian internationalism, giving priority to general human interests and values				87
12. The rights of the great powers		Disagree, %	Agree, %	%
In solving international problems the USSR and the United States should have the rights that correspond to their special position and status in the world community				32
In solving international problems the USSR and the United States should have the same rights as all other members of the world community				59
13. Human rights		Disagree, %	Agree, %	%
The observance of human rights in the USSR is a purely internal affair and is not subject to criticism from other countries				81
Human rights as a general human value cannot be a "zone beyond criticism," including from other countries				2
14. Are Soviet-American relations as significant as they were before		Disagree, %	Agree, %	%
In the future bilateral Soviet-American relations will recede to a less visible position in world politics				35

15. Ideological contradictions			
What, in your opinion, will be the dynamics of Soviet-American relations in the area of ideology?			%
Ideological contradictions will be aggravated			9
Ideological disagreements between the USSR and the United States will remain at the present level			
30 Ideological disagreements will decrease			42
The fundamental contradictions between the USSR and the United States in the sphere of ideology will ultimately disappear			8
16. Expansion of contacts			
If one is to speak about expanding contacts between Soviet and American citizens (tourism, trips on invitation, expanded access to the mass media, facilitation of telephone and computer communications, and so forth), do you agree that these contacts		Agree. %	Disagree. %
Can be a broad channel for the appearance in the USSR of ideologies that are alien to ours		24	65
Will contribute to the formation of a positive image of the USSR in the public opinion of the United States		89	4
Will not lead to any significant changes in public opinion in the USSR and the United States		15	72
Will contribute to the growth of mutual understanding and confidence between the nations		97	1
17. Restriction of information			%
At the present time there are a number of customs restrictions in effect for imports to the USSR from the United States and other Western countries of books, periodicals, videotapes, and other types of information. If the restrictions are retained for materials containing pornography, war propaganda, and racism, do you agree that there should be no other restrictions			
They should be retained in their present form			4
They should be expanded			2
They should be weakened			22
They should be removed altogether			70
18. Aid to developing countries			%
The USSR should render economic, scientific-technical, and military aid mainly to those developing countries which have entered on the noncapitalist or socialist path of development			24
The USSR should help the most needy developing countries, regardless of their social and political orientation			35
The USSR should reduce aid to developing countries to a minimum, using all resources for the country's domestic needs			38
19. Do armed forces guarantee security		Agree. %	Disagree. %
Military superiority of the USSR over the United States would be a guarantee of peace		5	86
In the event of an armed conflict between the USSR and the United States it would necessarily grow into a nuclear war		24	32
The fact that the USSR has nuclear weapons contributes to maintaining peace		56	27
The fact that the West has nuclear weapons contributes to maintaining peace		35	44
The United States will never be the first to use nuclear weapons		26	25
The USSR will never be the first to use nuclear weapons		66	5
20. Elimination of nuclear weapons			%
1) Do you consider it necessary to eliminate nuclear weapons completely?			
Yes, I do			74
No, I do not			17
Difficult to say			9
2) Do you consider it possible to eliminate nuclear weapons completely?			
Yes, I do			45
No, I do not			27
Difficult to say			28
3) If you answered in the affirmative to the preceding question, by which dates do you consider it possible to eliminate nuclear weapons completely?			
Before 2000			10

Before 2010	17
Before 2020	16
In the distant future	57
4) If you consider it impossible to eliminate nuclear weapons completely, which reasons do you consider to be the main ones (you may give several answers)?	
As soon as a nuclear weapon is invented and technically available to a number of countries it is impossible to eliminate it	43
As long as the contradictions between capitalism and socialism remain nuclear weapons play a deterrent role and neither country is interested in eliminating them completely	16
In the final analysis the West will not completely eliminate nuclear weapons	33
In the final analysis the USSR will not completely eliminate nuclear weapons	7
Other reasons	18

21. How is perestroika influencing Soviet-American relations?	Agree, %	Disagree, %
The success of perestroika will be perceived in the United States as growth of the "communist threat" and will lead to strengthening the confrontation with the USSR	8	58
The success or failure of perestroika in the USSR will ultimately have little effect on USSR-U.S. relations	6	85
The success of perestroika will on the whole evoke a positive reaction in the United States and will lead to improvement of relations with the USSR	78	8
The failure of perestroika will lead to worsening of USSR-U.S. relations		

*The answers "difficult to say" and "no opinion" are given only in those cases where they comprise an appreciable percentage and are important for understanding the spread of opinions and ideas of specialists.

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Chinese Disappointment with U.S. Economic Cooperation Viewed

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[Text] At the beginning of 1989 it had been 10 years since the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States. This event marked the end of a lengthy period of hostility and confrontation that had existed between the two countries and it signified a belated recognition by the United States of the realities that had developed in China since the People's Revolution of 1949.

The mutual path to this point was far from simple. Washington arrived at it through a 20-year political and economic blockade of the Chinese state and an almost 10-year period of gradual softening of their approach to the PRC. And China was overcoming the paroxysms of the cultural revolution and an ultra-left-wing ideology which during the seventies gradually began to be crowded out by new political and economic principles.

Normalization in the political area gave a powerful impetus to the development during the eighties of bilateral cooperation in many areas, including the sphere of economics.

The progress in American-Chinese relations took place against the background of a radical change in the PRC domestic policy. The 3d Plenum of CPC [Chinese Communist Party] Central Committee, 11th Convocation, held in December 1978, set forth a bold program of socioeconomic transformations directed toward overcoming the age-old backwardness and in a short period in history transforming the country's economy into an effectively operating mechanism based on extensive application of commodity-monetary relations under the conditions of the socialist system of management. The development of productive forces became a priority of state policy both within the country and in relations with the external world. This course was concretized in the decisions of the 12th (1982) and after that the 13th (1987) CPC congresses.

The American Approach

The U.S. foreign economic policy with respect to China after the end of World War II developed as a constituent and, moreover, a derived element of Washington's general strategic course in the Chinese area. Its evolution exerted the most direct influence on the course and scale of economic relations. At the same time in Washington's policy one can undoubtedly also trace important constant parameters which reflect both stable subjective ideas of the ruling elite with respect to China and objective realities, and they brought about the need for economic interaction between the two large Pacific Ocean powers.

Among the former, it seems that the leading position is held by the goal of creating in China a kind of geopolitical counterbalance to the Soviet Union in the Far East. One must say that in various stages this goal was achieved in different ways, in various practical steps and formulations. At the beginning of the seventies Washington regarded economic ties primarily as a support for the general process of normalization. At the end of the decade they were used increasingly as an instrument for stimulating the pro-American line in PRC foreign policy. This was the basis for the fundamental formula proclaimed in 1979 during a visit to the PRC by then Vice President W. Mondale that the process of the modernization of China corresponds to the national interests of the United States.¹

During this period Washington proceeded toward a ramified contractual-legal structure for regulating economic cooperation with China (a total of 25 agreements). The PRC's access to highly technological goods was expanded significantly, right to the point of arms, with the exception of the most modern systems. Beijing was given the most-favored-nation status in trade (to be sure, on a temporary basis to be renewed annually). Finally, the White House began to render planned assistance in arranging complicated new forms of economic cooperation and cooperative ties between the national economic complexes of the two countries.

Nonetheless as early as the beginning of the eighties built-in structural limitations in American-Chinese relations appeared and friction arose, which was brought about to a considerable degree by the contradictory nature of the initial premises of the American course with respect to economic ties with China. The continuing ideological mistrust of Beijing interwove with the objective difficulties of interaction between a socialist and a capitalist economy, building to a gigantic split at the level of scientific-technical and economic development.

But the main thing that impeded dynamic progress was still linked to the estimate of the PRC as a tactical ally, which presupposed and still presupposes cooperation of a temporary nature.

Against this background it is possible to understand the disparity between Beijing's expectations and the actual steps taken by Washington in the field of economic cooperation with the PRC. The Chinese side expects, first of all, to be included in the category of states enjoying free financial aid from the United States and, second, government support from the United States in the implementation of large-scale domestic economic and scientific-technical programs. Third, Washington still retains its technological restrictions on trade with the PRC by reducing trade to the level characteristic of the friends and allies of the United States. At the present time China has much greater capabilities of importing American equipment and technology than other socialist countries do. The "confidence" of the U.S. administration in the PRC is shown particularly by its agreement in

1978 to launch American communications satellites from Chinese territory using Chinese rocket carriers. At the same time there continues to be a ban on exporting science-intensive products "which are of special importance to the national security of the United States."²

The PRC has not yet managed to achieve a number of important privileges for its products on the American market even though in the 1979 trade agreement the United States recognized China to be a "developing country" which therefore has the right to a reduction of customs duties within the so-called "overall system of preferences." By now the United States is practically the only industrially developed capitalist country that does not grant these privileges to the PRC.

It should be noted that as the volumes of trade and economic relations grow and as the national economic complexes of the two countries come into ever closer contact, the United States develops a greater general commercial interest in China as a business partner. The economic interaction which has increased in tempo over the past decade will lose its previous dominating significance, although attempts are still being made to use trade and economic relations as a "lever" for applying pressure to the Chinese side. It was precisely in this key that representatives of Washington were operating when they threatened Beijing with placing stronger controls on the exports of technology and rejecting a number of projects because of PRC arms deliveries to the Near East. Certain American assessments of Chinese policy in questions of relations with the USSR, when Beijing was warned about the permissible limits of Soviet-Chinese rapprochement, can be evaluated in a similar way.

With all the zigzags and complexities of American policy, Washington's efforts must still be regarded as extremely significant. At the same time it must be recognized that the unprecedented upsurge of American-Chinese trade and economic relations is linked to a much greater degree to the activity of the Chinese side than to Washington's steps to meet them half way.

The Chinese Policy

The large burst in American-Chinese economic cooperation is directly related to the fundamental changes both in the foreign economic policy and in the internal economic life of the PRC. China not only rejected the principle of "relying on its own forces," which was understood to mean economic autarky, but also worked out an extremely consistent strategy for development with clearcut goals and means of achieving them.

Within the framework of the "open foreign economic policy" steps of great practical significance were taken.

As we know, a law on joint enterprises was adopted in 1979 and four "special economic zones" were created in the provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien. In 1984 14 cities of the coastal strip were opened up for foreign capital, and the next year "open economic regions" were established in the coastal provinces. Finally, in 1988 a

decision was made to create a "special economic zone" on the island of Hainan, where it was first permitted to sell property (land, resources, and so forth) to foreign owners.

During the period of 1979-1987 they adopted a total of more than 70 normative acts regulating foreign economic ties, which created a legal basis for the activity of foreign capital on the territory of the country. In the first half of 1988 they proclaimed a new economic strategy which envisions an export orientation for the coastal regions which, in turn, should provide the main impetus for the development of the internal areas of the country.

In parallel the PRC began transforming the system for control of foreign trade, mainly in the direction of decentralization of management functions. Specialized export-import companies were created within the framework of the branch ministries. Thirty-two of them appeared during 1979-1981 alone. The rights of the provinces and certain cities to conduct foreign trade operations were expanded significantly (true, not uniformly). Moreover, a number of large enterprises were given the right to enter the foreign market independently. These measures contributed to the growth of the country's foreign trade turnover by a factor of more than 5 during 1978-1988.

At the end of 1987 and the beginning of 1988 a new package of measures was developed for deepening the reform. It is intended to switch foreign trade companies over to a system of contractual responsibility, elements of which are now being developed experimentally. Only the volume of currency transferred to the state will be established for them from above. The provinces, autonomous regions, cities under central jurisdiction, and municipalities will be given the right to draw up their own plans for the development of foreign economic ties. Thus the center of gravity for management of foreign economic activity is to shift to the provincial level or even the level of the municipality. The central ministry of foreign trade and foreign economic ties (MVTiVS) should retain control only of a strictly limited number of the most important goods.

Although this reform is far from perfect, decentralization of control of foreign economic ties and the changeover of foreign trade companies to the contract system have already begun to produce their first results. According to data of the MVTiVS, during 1988 the country's foreign

trade volume increased by 16.6 percent as compared to 1987 and amounted to 79.4 billion dollars, which meant that the level of planning indicators for 1990 was reached. This success, in the opinion of Chinese specialists, was achieved to a decisive degree because of the reform of foreign trade.³

The program for modernization of the national economy and the "open foreign economic policy" along with the normalization of political relations created prerequisites for increasing the significance of economic factors in the system of relations between the PRC and the United States.

The Structure and Dynamics of Trade

During the past decade reciprocal trade has assumed an unprecedented scale. It continues to be the most important form of economic interaction between the two countries. While just before the normalization of diplomatic relations the volume of commodity turnover amounted to less than 1 billion dollars and the United States occupied fourth place among trade partners of the PRC, in 1988, according to American figures, it reached 13 billion dollars. This made it possible for the United States to become firmly entrenched in third place in China's foreign trade, falling only a little behind Hongkong and Japan. The U.S. share of China's foreign trade has reached almost 11 percent.

Chinese statistics give somewhat different data. According to them, the U.S. share of China's foreign trade in 1987 was 9.5 percent in general commodity turnover, 7.5 percent for exports, and 11.2 percent for imports.⁴

As one can see from the table, Chinese statistics differ significantly from the statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Thus China calculated that in 1987 it had a trade deficit with the United States of 1.7 billion dollars and not the positive balance of 3.3 billion reported by American sources. The reason for the discrepancy is that in the United States they count all goods shipped from the PRC to the United States and vice versa (including deliveries through third countries such as Hongkong) while China counts only direct deliveries. Moreover, the accepted practice in the United States of including expenditures on insurance and transportation in the estimates of the imports of their partners explains a difference of at least another 1 billion dollars.⁵

Trade Between PRC and United States, Millions of Dollars

Year	According to PRC Statistical Data				According to U.S. Statistical Data			
	Turnover	PRC Exports	PRC Imports	Balance	Turnover	PRC Exports	PRC Imports	Balance
1978	992	271	721	-450	1147	324	823	-499
1981	5888	1056	4382	-876	5493	1830	3598	-1768
1984	6470	2433	4037	-1604	6072	3067	3027	40
1985	7442	2352	5090	-2386	7683	3865	3876	-11
1986	7349	2332	4717	-1385	8300	4772	3136	1636

Trade Between PRC and United States, Millions of Dollars (Continued)

Year	According to PRC Statistical Data				According to U.S. Statistical Data			
	Turnover	PRC Exports	PRC Imports	Balance	Turnover	PRC Exports	PRC Imports	Balance
1987	7858	3083	4825	-1742	10075	6687	3388	3299

ZHONGGUO JINGJI NIANZAN (Annual of Economics of China), 1982, p 45; ZHONGGUO DUIWAI JINGJI MAOYI NIANZAN (Annual of Foreign Economic Ties and Foreign Trade of China), 1984, p 82; ZHONGGUO TONGJI NIANZAN (Statistical Annual of China), 1986, p 568; ibid., 1987, p 596; JINGJI RIBAO, 11 May 1988; THE CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW for the corresponding years; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1988.

Appreciable changes are being observed in the commodity structure of trade. At the end of the seventies in PRC exports there was a prevalence of textile items, clothing, footwear, china, and foodstuffs. To the American market they also shipped petroleum and petroleum products (after 1979), ores, and concentrates of nonferrous metals—tungsten, titanium, and chromium.

Chinese imports from the United States consisted mainly of foodstuffs, agricultural raw material, and industrial items. At the beginning of the eighties the United States became the largest grain supplier of grain to the PRC. In 1981 imports of American grain (mainly wheat and corn) reached 8.09 million tons, which comprised 54.6 percent of all of China's grain purchases from abroad.⁶ Moreover, China acquired large batches of soy beans and cotton on the American market. Important items in Chinese imports were synthetic textile fibers, timber materials, rolled ferrous metals, and mineral fertilizers. Deliveries of American machines, equipment, and means of transportation were small. Additionally the beginning of the implementation of the so-called policy of "regulation" of the national economy led to a decline of imports of this group. During 1978-1981 the United States' share of the overall quantity of imports of machines and equipment to the PRC amounted to an average of 7.6 percent.⁷

The commodity structure of bilateral trade that had emerged at the beginning of the eighties generated a number of problems even though the two sides managed to achieve a significant growth of commodity turnover. First of all the imbalance of commodity exchange increased, which raised the question of financing foreign trade operations. The problem was also aggravated by the fact that the United States granted the PRC practically no credit for paying for imports. The only source for augmenting reserves of foreign currency was to increase exports. This is the path China took.

During the middle and at the end of the eighties the influence of internal reforms in the PRC on the condition of American-Chinese trade relations increased appreciably, although there were no significant changes in the commodity structure of PRC exports to the United States. The basic import items in 1987 were still clothing (32 percent), handicrafts and toys (19 percent), fabrics (8 percent), foodstuffs (4 percent), and petroleum and petroleum products (8 percent).⁸ Thus the expansion of Chinese exports took place not so much as a result of diversification of deliveries as through increasing the

imports of a limited number of goods. This situation, incidentally, is typical of all PRC foreign trade.

Under these conditions providing for stable growth of exports presents a difficult task. With respect to the United States its solution is even more difficult because of the growth of protectionism in Washington's foreign trade policy. Local producers of fabrics, clothing, and footwear have waged and continue to wage (frequently with considerable results) a campaign to introduce restrictions on the importation of Chinese goods. Representatives of the textile lobby are especially active. By the middle of the eighties they managed to achieve from the administration the establishment of restrictions on 85 percent of the Chinese textile items imported to the United States.⁹ The third Sino-American agreement on trade in textile items which went into effect 1 January 1988 envisions restrictions on imports of 100 categories of textile items and limits the rates of their annual growth to 1.5 percent.¹⁰ The PRC is frequently accused of dumping, undermining the market, illegally subsidizing exports, and so forth. All of the aforementioned circumstances and also the drop in oil prices led to a situation in 1984-1986 where PRC exports to the United States not only did not increase but even decreased.

In 1987 Chinese deliveries to the American market in value terms increased, according to American data, by 30 percent. The increase was achieved because of the large devaluation of the yuan in 1986, which increased the ability of Chinese prices to compete, and because of the growth of the latter. At the same time the problem of expanding imports of Chinese goods to the United States is still far from being solved, which makes it difficult to achieve a stable balance in commodity exchange.

The economic transformations in the PRC had a considerably greater effect on the commodity structure of imports.

The development of the family contract and the increase in procurement prices for agricultural products led to an increase in the gross yields of the main grain and industrial crops, which enabled China to begin a gradual reduction of the imports of these goods. In 1985 purchases of American grain amounted to only 0.6 million tons. The importation of soy beans and cotton was almost completely stopped. In parallel there was an increase in the imports of machines and equipment. While in 1982 the proportion of these goods in the imports to the PRC from the United States was 10 percent, in 1984 it was 40 percent, and in 1986 it was 54

percent. They also purchased scientific instruments, chemical products, and raw material for the textile industry from the United States. In 1986 all of these products comprised about 78 percent of the imports to the PRC from the United States.¹¹ The role of the United States as the supplier of highly technological goods increased significantly. In 1986 China acquired from the American market approximately 17 percent of all the technical equipment it imported from abroad.¹² In 1987 the retardation of the growth rates of the production of agricultural products forced the PRC to increase again the imports of American grain and imports of machines and equipment decreased by approximately half. But it seems that this measure was forced and temporary while the interest of the PRC in American technical equipment and technology is long-term and stable in nature.

New Forms of Economic Cooperation

At the turn of the decade between the seventies and eighties a new form of bilateral economic exchanges appeared: cooperation directly in the production sphere through the creation of various kinds of joint enterprises and also facilities owned completely by one party but located on the territory of the other.

The practice of creating joint enterprises has become widespread on the basis of reciprocal trade and has retained a close connection to it. One of the goals China has set for itself while opening up access to foreign capital is the acceleration of the "transfer" of advanced technology to the country, above all to the export branches. The largest joint enterprises are also directed toward exports. Most of their products are sold on the foreign market. At the same time American firms, by concluding transactions with the PRC concerning joint production activity, try to penetrate into the Chinese market. In their opinion, "the result of the cooperation of American countries with the PRC can be not only profit but also access to its domestic market."¹³ In its policy China has been forced to take into account the requirements of foreign investors of capital. Thus when making the decision about opening up the coastal strip of China to foreign capital (1984) the Chinese leadership especially stipulated the right of foreign investors to sell a certain portion of the products of joint and purely foreign enterprises on the domestic market.

In 1979-1987 direct U.S. investments in the PRC economy amounted to 3.04 billion dollars.¹⁴ The proportion of American capital investments in the overall sum of foreign business investments amounted to about 14 percent.¹⁵ The number of facilities using American capital reached 408, of which 102 were established in 1987.¹⁶

At the present time joint enterprises are operating in the petroleum industry, machine building, automotive construction, pharmaceuticals, the food industry, tourism, and the hotel business. It should be noted that this branch structure was not formed all at once. At first joint

enterprises were created mainly in the sphere of tourism (construction and joint management of hotels). The largest joint venture was the creation of the "Great Wall" hotel in Beijing, in which about 70 million dollars were invested. Besides tourism American investments have been used mainly for the food, textile, and certain other branches of light industry. American companies have shown a considerable amount of interest in prospecting and developing petroleum extraction on the shelf of the South China Sea. The situation began to change in 1985 when joint enterprises gradually began to be created in the basic branches. This change took place within the framework of the overall change in the PRC policy concerning the enlistment of foreign investments and the shift of the center of gravity to the basic branches. At the present time the largest Sino-American joint enterprise of this type is the Beijing Jeep firm with the participation of the American General Motors company. At the beginning of 1988 an agreement was reached to expand the enterprise. It is planned to construct capacities for annually producing 150,000-300,000 engines with a volume of 4,000 cubic centimeters. It is also intended to construct a factory for producing spare parts and repairing equipment.¹⁷ Among the largest Sino-American facilities one should mention the joint enterprise for producing containers in Tientsin and the enterprise in Shanghai for assembling MD-82 aircraft with the participation of the MacDonnell-Douglas firm.

U.S. firms continue to show a heightened interest in Chinese petroleum despite the decline of world prices for petroleum products and the extremely modest results of the search for deposits during the first half of the eighties. Agreements for the development of petroleum on the shelf have been concluded with 12 American companies. American firms are also searching for petroleum in the internal regions of the PRC, particularly in the Caidam and Tarim depressions. The American Geosos company has discovered 13 petroleum and gas structures there.¹⁸

The creation of joint enterprises on the territory of the PRC is encountering many difficulties. They arise because of the immense and confused bureaucratic system that has developed in the country, the Chinese specialists' ignorance of modern management methods, the language barrier, and the taxes which are too high in the opinion of the foreign partners. Problems have also arisen because of wages. Although the average wages at joint enterprises are higher by a factor of 2.5-2.8 than they are at state enterprises, nonetheless, in the opinion of the Americans, they do not create sufficient incentive for the productive labor of the workers. This approach is also shared by Chinese workers. This is shown by the unrest at the Beijing Jeep enterprises in 1987 when 4,000 workers employed in production demanded higher wages.¹⁹ Additional difficulties arise because of the fact that the PRC and the United States have not yet been able to create a solid legal basis for cooperation in this area. Except for the agreement concerning the elimination of dual taxation that was signed in 1984, there have

been no large agreements. Negotiations for concluding a bilateral agreement for the protection of investments have been underway for several years but so far have led to no appreciable results.

All this bears upon the extremely modest scale of one-time investments. They usually do not reach more than 2 million dollars. More than half of the joint enterprises are based on less than 1 million dollars of American capital.²⁰

It would seem that China took the most radical step for expanding its foreign economic ties at the end of the seventies when the practice of creating joint enterprises on the territory of the United States was introduced. According to figures for the end of 1987, there are 73 enterprises there which are based on Sino-American or all Chinese capital, which comprises 19 percent of the overall number of Chinese enterprises abroad.²¹ The factors motivating the PRC to invest money in business activity on the territory of the United States are not so much a desire for profit as to become familiar with advanced methods of production management, to study their partner's market conditions in greater detail, and to train personnel. Cooperation between the PRC and American firms in the United States is developing mainly in the food industry, printing, and the production of fabrics and bedding. In recent years it has gradually spread to other branches as well.

Joint business activity is becoming an important and extremely promising part of the complex of trade and economic ties between the two countries. In the future business investments will be comparable to reciprocal trade in terms of their significance. There are possibilities of this, especially taking into account the concept suggested by the Chinese leadership of developing the coastal regions and creating an economy oriented toward exports there, which will require the enlistment of large volumes of foreign capital. At the same time the realization of this possibility will depend largely on whether or not the PRC manages to create an investment climate that is attractive to American investors.

During the 10 years that have passed since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States the sides have been able to achieve unprecedented progress in the arrangement of economic ties. Although there continue to be considerable unutilized reserves in such areas of finance and credit, various forms of transfer of technology, joint implementation of large-scale projects, and so forth, economic interaction has ceased to be any kind of secondary element in the system of Chinese-American relations and has become more resistant to the fluctuations of the political conditions. This has been achieved to a considerable if not a decisive degree by the ability of the Chinese leadership to find unusual solutions in the sphere of economic policy. At the same time it is still premature to discount the influence of economic factors on the state of affairs in the economic area. The events of the eighties have shown that the aggravation of differences regarding

various political issues can create obstacles on the path to bilateral trade and economic cooperation, even if they are of a smaller scale than they were in the seventies. Therefore maintaining stable political relations is still the main prerequisite for successful economic ties.

At the same time there is a reverse connection. At the beginning of the eighties after China entered upon a course toward providing favorable international conditions for modernization and maintaining normal relations with all groups of states, the United States also began gradually to recognize that under the current conditions it was unrealistic to rely on achieving "strategic interaction" with the PRC exclusively on an anti-Soviet basis. The power methods of applying pressure on China to which the Reagan regime resorted were not successful either. Under these conditions economic cooperation might have been the only area that opened up the possibilities of looking for broad compromises and achieving visible results. Moreover the growth of the scale of trade and economic exchanges between the two countries led to the appearance in the U.S. business world of an influential group of representatives of leading companies who were in favor of expanding economic ties with China. At the present time economic cooperation is increasingly determining the prospects for the development of the entire system of American-Chinese relations. In spite of the existence of serious disagreements concerning a number of concrete problems, an ever greater parallelism of interests is appearing in the economic sphere.

The next qualitative leap in the economic cooperation of the two countries could apparently be achieved on the basis of a principally new approach which would envision the implementation of large-scale multilateral projects with shared participation of such countries as the USSR and Japan along with the United States and China. In China they are already actively discussing the possibilities of utilizing the Chinese work force to assimilate the natural resources of the Far East and Siberia with the support of American and Japanese capital. This kind of a breakthrough would require a good deal of effort on the part of all countries involved. But the future lies with this kind of approach.

Footnotes

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 29 August 1979.
2. GUOJI MAOYI, 1987, No 10, p 6.
3. BEIJING REVIEW, 1989, No 10, p 16.
4. Calculated from: JINGJI RIBAO, 24 February; 11 May 1988.
5. "China: Economic Policy and Performance in 1987," A CIA Report, Washington, 1988, p 21.
6. Calculated from: ZHONGGUO DUIWAY JINGJI MAOYI NIANZAN, 1986, p 118; U.S.-China Trade Statistics, Washington, 1983, p 21.

7. ZHONGGUO DUILI JINGJI MAOYI NIAN-ZAN, 1986, p 10; U.S.-China Trade Statistics, p 12.
8. GUOJI MAOYI, 1987, No 5, p 56; China: Economic Policy and Performance in 1987, Washington, 1988, p 12.
9. GUOJI MAOYI, 1985, No 4, p 38.
10. RENMIN RIBAO, 21 December 1987.
11. Calculated from GUOJI MAOYI, 1987, No 5, p 56; HAIYANG TONGJI, 1987, No 1, p 122.
12. Calculated from: ZHONGGUO TONGJI NIAN-ZAN, 1987, pp 592, 602; HAIYANG TONGJI, 1987, No 1, pp 122-123.
13. United States-China Economic Relations Appraisal: A Workshop Sponsored by the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate and the Congressional Research Service, Washington, 1982, pp 69, 72.
14. BEIJING REVIEW, 1988, No 25, p 15.
15. LIAOWANG, 1988, No 52, p 9.
16. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 March 1987.
17. BEIJING REVIEW, 1988, No 3, p 30.
18. Ibid., 1988, No 7, p 30.
19. Ibid., 1988, No 3, p 25.
20. Technology Transfer to China. Hearings... Washington, 1988, p 43.
21. RENMIN RIBAO, 19 March 1988, JINGJI RIBAO, 1 March 1988.

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DISCUSSIONS: THE LESSONS OF AFGHANISTAN

Decision to Intervene Militarily in Afghanistan Reconsidered

18030012c Moscow SShA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 89 pp 56-77

Editorial Introduction

18030012c Moscow SShA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 89 p 56

[Summary of NEW YORKER article not translated by JPRS]

[Text]

From the editors: The American magazine THE NEW YORKER for 11 April 1988 published a fairly long article under the striking heading of "Bloody Games."

The authors of this article are Richard Barnet, an eminent American political scientist, and Eqbal Ahmad, a professor and well-known political scientist from Pakistan who has taught at Chicago, Cornell, and other American universities. A number of Soviet scholars and journalists who saw the article "Bloody Games" wanted to express their ideas.

Below is a summary of R. Barnet and E. Akhmad's article written by N.B. Yaroshenko and the texts from the Soviet authors.

U.S. Activities in Afghanistan Before Invasion Denounced

18070350 Moscow SShA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOIY in Russian No 6, Jun 89 pp 62-68

[Article by Maj Gen Kim Makedonovich Tsagolov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "Not Everything Is So Simple (an Open Letter to Richard Barnet and Eqbal Ahmad)"]

[Text] Dear Gentlemen!

The great German poet and thinker Johann Wolfgang Goethe once said: "It is much easier to find a mistake than the truth. The mistake lies on the surface, and you notice it immediately, but the truth is deeply hidden, and not just anyone can find it." This remark pertains directly to those who would like to catch the truth by the tail without exerting much effort. Slightness in notions of its attainability is a real problem for researchers. This is understandable, for it is the researcher's job to find the pearl of truth in tons of raw facts. Such good fortune will not smile on just anyone, but any honest scientist must strive to comprehend the truth. This is his professional and civic duty.

These were my first thoughts when reading your article "Bloody Games," published in the magazine THE NEW YORKER on 11 April 1988. I will say right off that the material interested me for two reasons. First, you are writing about events in a country which I have visited many times and whose life I saw for myself. Second, you are trying to comprehend the problems of one of the most complex and difficult regional conflicts. Of course, you are doing this through a prism of your understanding, your vision, and individual facts, and the phenomenon as a whole. It is for these reasons that my desire came about to participate in your thoughts. To participate, not as an opponent, but as an interlocutor, striving, together with you, to see the social processes in Afghanistan in their real form, through a prism of logic and history. I think that my joining your discussion will be in the spirit of new thinking. My goal, as you will see, is not to refute you, but to discuss the Afghanistan drama with you.

I think you are right, noting two indisputable facts. The first was that this was "...the largest, longest, and costliest Soviet military operation since the Second World War." You write further that "the United States, in

support of the Afghan resistance, has been waging its most elaborate and expensive covert war since the Central Intelligence Agency's operations in Laos and Cambodia in the early 1970s." It is hard not to agree with you here, too.

It is worth pondering over why the CIA so carefully, thoughtfully, and consistently conducted and is conducting its covert operations against the sovereign nation of Afghanistan. How to explain that plans for financing the contras in Nicaragua, as a rule, evoke violent debates in Congress, but aid to the Afghan Mujahedin is obediently approved by the legislators?

In your arguments one can clearly trace the thought that Afghanistan has never interested the U.S. and that it has riveted the attention of the USSR, who supposedly wanted to turn this country into a South Asian equivalent of Finland: Afghanistan could preserve its traditional customs in its domestic life, but "...in international affairs should promote Soviet interests." Is that so? But you see, both the course of the rest of the discussion and the objectiveness of assessing the act of Soviet troops being introduced into Afghanistan depend decisively on the vision of these problems.

Above all, I am convinced that the U.S. always showed increasing interest over the years to the Islamic region as a whole, and Afghanistan in particular. This interest intensified especially after the anti-monarchical overthrow of M. Daoud in 1973 and all the more so after the events that took place in Iran in February-April 1979.

I am sure that the U.S. did not want to forgive Afghanistan for its firm refusal to join the aggressive, anti-Soviet SEATO pact. I would like to convince you that this is not just my opinion. You can read about this in the book by your fellow-countryman F. Bonosky, "Washington's Secret War Against Afghanistan." Pay attention to the title of F. Bonosky's book. This is a secret war of a great power against a small sovereign country located tens of thousands of kilometers from the U.S. The title is indicative of something, is it not?

After a fundamentalist opposition to the Daoud government of Afghanistan emerged on the territory of Pakistan, the U.S. secret services wanted aggressive, result-producing actions from it. You know that such fundamentalist organizations as the IPA (the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, led by Gulbadin Hekmatyar) and the ISA (the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani) emerged between 1974 and 1975. It is natural that after the failure of the anti-Daoud revolt (1975), those who supplied these organizations with both money and weapons expected rapid, specific actions from their main leaders. In this regard, I do not consider accidental the appearance in Pakistan of the rather well-known Robert Lessart, who became experienced in Islamic affairs back during the period when he helped the Shah of Iran create the sinister organization SAVAK. I do not think that the appearance of this man there was the result of his nostalgia for the Orient, which

is evidenced by the sharp intensification of the activities of the Afghan opposition in Pakistan.

I also call your attention—in analyzing the activities of American special services in Pakistan—to the nature of the activities of the Drug Enforcement Administration, under whose mask operated those from among whom the Afghan opposition trained executioners for future bloody work in Afghanistan. Incidentally, the Indian weekly BLITZ also wrote about this secret bureau on 9 and 12 January 1980. The 9 January issue contains quite interesting details.

First of all, the head of the above-mentioned administration (the organization itself is based in Washington), Peter Bensinger, sent a letter to the American Ambassador in Pakistan in which the ambassador is notified that "Pakistani territory...has been placed at the complete disposal of the well-known American subversive agency—the Central Intelligence Agency."

Secondly, P. Bensinger informed the ambassador that Lewis Adams, a special agent in charge of the CIA department in Lahore, had left for Peshawar. Furthermore, he reminds him that Adams had organized and accomplished in Lahore on 18 January 1979 "one measure, the results of which proved to be extremely beneficial for the interests of the United States." It is interesting, just what did he organize and carry out that was so beneficial for the U.S.? And who was he?

You do not need me to tell you about L. Adams—an experienced CIA agent. He had considerable experience in such work. Before Pakistan, he was operating in Vietnam and then was transferred to Lahore (1977) to assist the Pakistani Secret Service in organizing intelligence operations against India. In Lahore, he held a meeting with leaders of the Afghan opposition. After this came his transfer to Peshawar, that is, closer to the borders of Afghanistan. But the point is not the meeting itself; it is more important what was prepared at the meeting. A correspondent of the weekly BLITZ alludes to "...a diabolical plan of the CIA, which, having been unable to lure Afghanistan into the American snare, had paved the way to provide broad support for a 'holy war' unleashed by 'rebels' mainly from the territory of Pakistan." Of course, the United States, which recognized the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), needed a reason to change its attitude toward it; Washington was looking for an acceptable basis to justify a decisive turn toward the opposition. The murder of Adolph Dubs, U.S. Ambassador in Kabul, on 14 February 1979 became this reason. But perhaps... Here the famous telegram from the newspaper magnate Hearst to his correspondent in Havana: "I give you riots, you give me photographs."

What followed the murder of A. Dubs? Pay attention: The United States used this as a reason for a sharp change in its attitude toward official Kabul. It annulled all agreements on granting economic aid to Afghanistan, charged Kabul with human rights violations, and gave its

covert operations an openly anti-Afghan nature. All this unequivocally shows how aggressively the CIA wove the thread of conspiracy around Afghanistan. And Pakistan turned out to be the coordination center of all this activity. An article published in the Pakistani newspaper MILLAT on 4 July 1979 also indicates this: "As a result of the Iranian revolution, the CIA has transferred its headquarters to Pakistan. From there it has been instructed to maintain control over the development of events in Afghanistan and Iran."

Back before the Saur events of 1978 (as the Afghans and Pakistanis call the April revolution), not only weapons but also trained Afghan emigre cadres were infiltrated covertly into Afghanistan from Pakistan. Incidentally, between 1973 and 1977 more than 6,000 fighters were trained there to be sent into Afghanistan for subversive operations against their own people. But you see, the April revolution had not come yet!

I refer you again to F. Bonosky, who concluded that by the April revolution of 1978, the U.S. had in Afghanistan a broad, well-organized network for carrying out subversive operations and interference in its internal affairs. I think that this is important for a more truthful understanding of what took place in this country after 1978.

Of course, what took place in Afghanistan in 1978 could not please either internal reactionary forces or those who were directing them. I am not talking about outward manifestations of feelings; I have in mind internal strategic guidelines and goals. Outwardly, the United States recognized the new power in the DRA one week after the overthrow of the Daoud regime. But this was only outwardly; actually, the intensive work of covert services had begun. Already in May 1978, the first base for training terrorists from the Afghan counterrevolutionary opposition was set up in Pakistan with help from the CIA. A base in the area of Akhazray-Dag began operation in June; a base near Arawali—in January 1979; a large base for 600 people at Mirhani—in June; a base for 150 at Baghe—in September; and in December a base for 700 was set up at Warsak, about 30 km northwest of Peshawar; and so forth. These rebel training centers grew like mushrooms after a warm spring rain. Large bases such as the ones at Mir Ali (for 2,000 people), Sadda (for 1,200), Tanagi (for 900), and others operated at full capacity. These training centers trained quite a wide range of specialists: from general military training to training sabotage terrorists, demolition experts, specialists in mine-laying, and so forth. Instructors from the United States worked at many of the centers, for example, at Mujammadgart, Landi-Kantal, Warsak, Attok, Mashohel, Islamabad, and Tutma-Heli. I will note that it was at these centers that personnel for the most complicated military specialties were trained.

I assume that you do not know about these deeds of the CIA, which operated actively and quite aggressively, without regard for the norms of inter-state relations. Remember the incident with Louis Dupree. The Afghans expelled this CIA agent from Kabul in November 1978.

For good reason, probably! True, he did not go far—he ended up in Pakistan. Here he headed the group which included the already mentioned Lessart, as well as Louis Robinson, Vagon David, Rogers Breck, and other CIA colleagues.

I recall all of this for just one purpose: I invite you to examine the introduction of limited Soviet military contingent into Afghanistan not just as a fact isolated from everything that was taking place around Afghanistan. In this case, it was a consequence. And it is impossible to understand the effect by overlooking the cause. If you look closely into the secret causes that put certain forces into action, you would see the quite dangerous games of the U.S., Iran, and Pakistan, and you would see a thread stretching to the secret agencies of these countries. Then the problem of introducing Soviet troops would be shown in a different light.

In a discussion about why the Russians introduced troops into Afghanistan, how can you not take into account the real threat that hung over the new power in this country? How can you ignore the fact that already by the end of 1979 about 40,000 trained murderers were moved into the DRA from Pakistan and Iran? Is it fair to overlook the anti-Afghan hullabaloo pumped up in Pakistan? It went so far as direct interference in the affairs of sovereign Afghanistan, a full-fledged member of the United Nations. What else can you call the actions of the band of Kanzady-Khan, former deputy inspector general of the police of Pakistan's Northwestern Frontier Province. Its "strolls" into the district of Kama in Nangarhar as well as Pakistan's military preparations indicated that a major armed adventure was being prepared against sovereign Afghanistan. Could we, under these conditions, remain indifferent to the fate of a nation friendly to us, especially since the leaders of this country by that time had more than once requested Soviet assistance to put a stop to possible aggression from the outside?

Of course, the decision to introduce the limited military contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan had its weak points, which the Soviet press has talked about openly. We ourselves are carefully analyzing our "past sins," our hasty steps. We are also searching for answers to questions: How did this all happen? Why was such a big question as introducing troops resolved by such a small circle of people? Perhaps there were other ways to resolve this problem? These are agonizing questions for us. But we are analyzing them not apart from the real political situation, not from the height of the current situation, but namely in the context of how it was in 1979. I think that it is also more important for us to analyze this problem from the standpoint of the great responsibility that is placed on our countries. Then the need to weigh everything will become clearer, which new political thinking urges. And I am convinced of another thing: If that responsibility and that political realism which is typical of today had existed in the relations between our countries in 1979, there would have been different accents, different actions in the practical steps of our countries.

Now, concerning some of the theses you stated. You write that the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was formed as a political party by merging various Marxist circles. In the article you very often use the words "communism" and "communist" with respect to the PDPA and what took place in Afghanistan in 1978. I do not think that the PDPA, even by stretching it, can be called a communist party. If you carefully trace the political life of Afghanistan in the 1950s through the 1970s, there can be only one conclusion: Serious democratic tendencies matured in the Afghan society which also led to the formation of the People's Democratic Party.

Yes, the left-wing democratic intelligentsia of Afghanistan was familiar with Marxist literature and used Marxist phraseology. But this is not at all a reason to consider it pro-communist. The PDPA is a revolutionary democratic party with a completely obvious democratic nature of program guidelines and goals, strategy and tactics. As proof, I would like to direct your attention to the PDPA Program published in the first two issues of *KHALQ* (April 1966). Here it was emphasized that the PDPA would strive to create a national-democratic government based on a "combined national front of all progressive, democratic, and patriotic forces, that is, workers, peasants, progressive intelligentsia, craftsmen, and petty national bourgeoisie who are fighting for national independence, democratization of public life, and completing the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist struggle." I have no doubt whatsoever that you understand perfectly well the democratic but not the communistic nature of a party having these program guidelines. And this is quite natural, for the PDPA essentially became the heir to the ideas and goals of such democratic organizations as "Vish Zalmiyan," "Nidai Khalq," and "Vatan."

Finally, you must bear in mind that the objective conditions also had not matured in Afghanistan for creating a communist party and, the main thing, it did not have the necessary social and class base for this.

The article unequivocally alludes to the so-called "hand of Moscow." You write: "The Kremlin did not take it (that is, the PDPA) very seriously, but this disregard did not prevent Soviet leaders from trying to give it direction." I am not sure that the Soviets gave the PDPA direction. As proof of the disparity of this version of reality, I can direct attention to your thought that the Soviet Ambassador in Afghanistan was not even aware of what had happened on 27 April 1978. I think that this is revealing, for if the Kremlin were directing the actions of the PDPA, the ambassador would have been up on this.

You write that "the improbable Afghan revolution would most likely not have happened without the entry of yet another major player, the Shah of Iran." Later on, you have a quite notable change of thought when you quote S. Harrison, a prominent specialist on South Asia at the Carnegie Endowment. Here is that thought: "...the

Shah of Iran, not Leonid Brezhnev, who triggered the chain of events culminating in the overthrow of the Muhammad Daoud regime. Beginning in 1974, Iran, encouraged by the United States, made a determined effort to draw Kabul into a western-tilted, Tehran-centered regional economic and security sphere embracing Pakistan, India and the Persian Gulf states."

That is a very interesting thesis. You are reconfirming what I wanted to call your attention to from the very beginning, namely the cause-and-effect chain: "United States—Iran—Afghanistan," the "determined effort" of the U.S. to draw Afghanistan into the sphere of its strategy in order to create a large "arc" on the southern borders of the Soviet Union. I think that in the global strategy, Afghanistan attracted U.S. attention, not as an individual object from the standpoint of its internal development, but as a country occupying a specific geostrategic position in the overall belt of Islamic states which could be given an anti-Soviet nature. This is the old idea of the late J.F. Dulles to use the anti-communist potential of Islam.

In a strictly scientific context, the thought of an external catalyst of such a large-scale social phenomenon as a social revolution is unproductive. However, Iran and especially the United States also bear serious responsibility for the development of events in and around Afghanistan. The U.S. would have benefited from Iran being the center of attraction. The U.S. figured that the loyal Shah of Iran would be a dominant figure. But history saw things differently. The Iranian revolution sweeps away the shah, and Islamic fundamentalism storms into the scene. I do not think this was part of the U.S. plans. The game that was begun was getting out of control. Indicative in this context is the constant "reshuffling of cards" in the "Peshawar Seven." Did you not notice that at first B. Rabbani—one of the leaders of Islamic fundamentalism—was appointed president in the so-called transitional government? He did not last long, and Subhagulla Mojaddidi emerged in front. Was such a rapid change of figures a coincidence? I think not, for the second figure, with his pro-Western orientation, better suited those who were calling the shots.

If you closely trace the development of events in Afghan society following the anti-monarchical overthrow of M. Daoud in 1973 and the period right before the April revolution, I doubt whether you would conclude that the April revolution of 1978 was highly improbable. After Daoud came to power, he could not realize his goals. The country's already difficult economic situation continued to worsen. The standard of living was falling, and unemployment, the budget deficit, inflation, foreign indebtedness, and payments to clear it were rising. Daoud's widely publicized economic program remained at the level of social demagoguery. The popular masses were losing faith in the regime's economic potentialities.

Things were no better in the political sphere. Attacked by right-wing forces, Daoud was increasingly slipping

toward a military-bureaucratic dictatorship. The right-wing extremist element was beginning to stir in the country with increasing strength. Anti-Daoud activities intensified sharply by such reactionary organizations as the "Muslim Brotherhood" and "Muslim Youth." The political situation in the country had reached the breaking point. The murder of Mir Akbar Haybara by extremists on 17 April 1978 was the last straw. His funeral turned into a huge demonstration, to which the Daoud government responded with a series of repressive measures against the country's democratic forces. I think that then-U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan D. Elliot could tell us much about all this, especially if he remembers his confidential meeting with Daoud on 24 April 1978 at a closed restaurant of the Central Army Corps. Does it not bother you that after this meeting, leaders of the PDPA were arrested on 24 and 25 April? Do you not see a connection between these events?

Your article contains quite a few other aspects that not only cause doubts, but also surprise me. For example, where you write that "the Soviets would disarm suspect units at night and return the rifles and machine guns only at daybreak." Or where you assert that "the fundamentalists are much like the Communists, and neither can govern Afghanistan for much the same reasons."

Of course, the first thesis, to put it mildly, does not at all correspond to the truth. As an eyewitness, I can decisively confirm that this is fictitious and that cases of the "Soviets disarming Afghans" did not happen and could not have happened. The best relations existed between the Afghan and Soviet soldiers. This was a friendship cemented by protecting the achievements of the people. And I could cite numerous other examples.

As far as the similarity of fundamentalists and Communists is concerned, this thesis shows decisively that neither of these pleases you. This is not because there is some similarity between the two. There is not and cannot be any. You well know this. The fact is that the United States feels a certain discomfort both from fundamentalists and from Communists. In this way they are similar, although the former lead to throwing the society back and the latter to social progress. You yourselves correctly note the goal of American strategy, when you write: "The Reagan Doctrine was, from an ideological standpoint, a declaration of all-out war on Communism." That is precisely why the U.S. ended up being a partner with the Mujahedin.

You have been convinced in practice that the Soviet leadership acts in full conformity with the letter and spirit of the Geneva Accords. All our steps are dictated by concern both for the fate of the Afghan people and for stability in this region. Can you find similar actions on the part of the United States and Pakistan? I think not! On the contrary, the United States and Pakistan are doing everything they can to see that the bloodshed continues on Afghan soil. These actions can hardly be called reasonable, for they continue to sow evil. You see, evil cannot be the friend of reason. Only good can be the

friend of reason. Let us comprehend together both the historical events and our responsibility from a position of reason, justice, and good.

Plea for Release of Archival Data

18030012c Moscow SSHA: *EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 6, Jun 89 pp 68-70

[Article by Mikhail Abramovich Milshteyn, doctor of historical sciences, retired lieutenant general, head scientific associate at the Institute of the United States and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "How the Decision Was Made"]

[Text] And so on 15 February 1989, strictly in keeping with the Geneva agreements, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan. This action was a large international event in the area of a correct and the most effective contribution to solving the problems of one of the most crucial and prolonged regional conflicts. Moreover the Soviet military contingent left Afghanistan in spite of the fact that certain countries with their extensive aid to the rebel forces were trying to delay or even stop the withdrawal of our troops.

It is perhaps too soon to sum up the final results and give a comprehensive analysis of all that took place in Afghanistan that was involved in the adoption of the decision to send our troops into this country and their actual entry and participation in battles and operations. Many people in the West, including R. Barnet and E. Ahmad, try to draw a direct analogy between the actions of our armed forces in Afghanistan and the actions of the Americans in Vietnam.

From the standpoint of final results this is perhaps correct. But from the standpoint of the nature and the character of the participation, the factors that caused the armed intervention of the third country, and the scale of combat activities this comparison can hardly be considered correct. And it is not only that 543,000 American servicemen were participating in combat in Vietnam in April 1969, which is considerably more than the Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan, or even that U.S. strategic aircraft participated actively and on a large scale in Vietnam.

The fact is that Vietnam is located at a great distance from the United States and presented no threat and indeed could not threaten the security of this country. Afghanistan, on the other hand, is the immediate neighbor of the USSR. And, consequently, what was happening there was far from a matter of indifference to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the legitimate and generally recognized Afghan government had repeatedly asked our government for help with the difficult situation and the actions of the counterrevolutionary forces in the country who were broadly supported by Pakistan and a number of other countries. Moreover one must take into account that a real people's war was being waged against the American armed forces, they were directly defeated, and the Saigon government was overthrown.

It also seems to me that one cannot directly and simply raise the question of how the entry of our troops into Afghanistan ended or whether their actions there ended in victory or defeat.

Perhaps we should consider our greatest victory to be the fact that we left Afghanistan. Under extremely difficult conditions, with unrest in the country, and with the fact that a number of countries were interested in having our troops drawn into more combat, the Soviet leadership on its own initiative with the agreement of the Afghan government, made a decision to withdraw its troops. Such a decision in and of itself is extremely significant: It gave the green light to the most rapid national reconciliation, an end to the senseless bloodletting in the country, and a cessation of the economic, moral, and human exhaustion. It was also clearly demonstrated that we are sincerely striving for peace in this region: The Soviet Union has refuted all fabrications about our country's alleged aggressive plans and our desire to seize the territory and threaten Iran.

In general the question of victory or defeat in such a war is very complicated and contradictory. It should be considered through the prism of the causes, goals, and tasks set for our troops when they entered there. Therefore when looking back and evaluating the events retrospectively in order to draw lessons from them and correctly evaluate the gains and losses, the question must be raised not so much on the plane of victory or defeat as from the standpoint of whether the decision to send the troops in in December 1979 was justified or was insufficiently considered and substantiated. There is no doubt that it will be possible to obtain a correct answer to this question only when all the necessary information related to the discussion at the highest levels and the decision which entailed such serious and to a certain extent tragic consequences is revealed and made public. And it is necessary and extremely important to do this sooner or later (of course it is better sooner than later). Access to these materials could make it possible for scholars and specialists to analyze in detail all the circumstances related to the entry of our troops into Afghanistan and to clarify that which was evaluated correctly and what omissions and mistakes were made. On the basis of these materials it would also be possible to conduct a scientific and practical conference at which one could consider all aspects of Soviet-Afghan relations during those years in order to make our policy more flexible and effective and to avoid mistakes in the future.

One can say ahead of time that the question of the entry of our troops into Afghanistan was not a simple matter and many people and departments participated in careful preparation for it. And while the people who prepared for this decision and adopted it are still alive it is important for them to discuss everything openly so that our people will have detailed information about everything. How good it would be if, for example, A.A. Gromyko or B.N. Ponomarov, who probably played no small role during the discussion and adoption of the

decision, were to start by publishing serious articles on this subject in our periodical press.

There arises a multitude of questions which must be answered in order to recreate a clear and dispassionate picture of the circumstances of the entry of our troops into Afghanistan. For example, it seems that there would hardly be any of those who prepared and adopted the decision in its final variant who assumed that our troops would have to participate in bloody battles, sustaining losses of human life and military equipment for 9 whole years, still without accomplishing the main task—national reconciliation. True, the accomplishment of this task depended not so much on combat activities as on a correct policy of the Afghan government itself in the economic, humanitarian, religious, and other areas.

One would hardly expect that our troops would sustain such huge losses as a result of participating in combat activities. As we know, more than 15,000 Soviet fighting men died in the distant Afghan land, 35,000 were wounded and maimed, and 311 are missing in action. The price was too high. These losses have been calculated but who can calculate the moral and human losses? Moreover it is unclear to what extent other aspects of the situation, which were clearly manifested during the course of the tormentous battles in Afghanistan—for instance, the geographical peculiarities of the country, the role of the clergy, the tribal and national contradictions, the intraparty struggle within the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan], and so forth—were given attention or taken into account. And did they discuss the policy with respect to this country in the future, after the entry of our troops?

A broad and open discussion of these questions would make it possible to bring complete clarity and to answer many of them which still remain unanswered and cause false interpretations and questionable evaluations. The time has come to figure all this out. Of course this must be done in such a way so as not to complicate even more the already extremely complicated situation in Afghanistan and so that, additionally, the discussion in no way harms our security. At the same time this should be done in such a way that the mistakes made in this case will never be repeated in the future. Possibly the new members of the Supreme Soviet will want to create a special commission for studying everything that was related to the entry of our troops into Afghanistan. This commission could not only study all the necessary materials but also hear all those who could give important testimony concerning the adoption of this decision.

The truth must out, and it undoubtedly will.

Decision to Intervene Based on False Assumptions
18030012c Moscow *SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 6, Jun 89 pp 70-77

[Article by Genrikh Aleksandrovich Trofimenco, doctor of historical sciences, professor, ISKAN division chief: "With an Inexperienced Hand..."]

[Text] I think that if, say, tomorrow all the documents pertaining to the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 were declassified and made public, it would be very difficult to determine the real motivation for this move.

Take, for example, the Caribbean crisis, the Aesopian name for the Soviet-American conflict associated with the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuba in the autumn of 1962. More than a quarter of a century has passed since that time. But with each new discussion of this crisis scholars and politicians become aware of new facts, new layers of political discussion, organizational measures, psychological principles, and strategic and tactical calculations of each of the participating countries, which force specialists to evaluate the motivations of the sides anew each time (although many documents that pertain directly to this crisis have not yet been declassified—either in our country or in the United States or in Cuba).

Of course one can list a number of considerations which could support—and, obviously, did support—the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. More than 2 weeks after the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan certain of them were disclosed officially. In an interview with a PRAVDA correspondent published in the newspaper on 13 January 1979, then General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev gave the major cause of what he called the "difficult" decision made by the Soviet leadership. Aid was rendered to the government of Afghanistan in order to repulse the external aggression which was supposed to have started against revolutionary Afghanistan by imperialism and its allies. Moreover, this pertained not only to protecting the conquests of the April (1978) revolution in the country but also not allowing Afghanistan to be transformed into "an imperialist military arena on our country's southern border." Moreover, as has been repeatedly emphasized in our announcements, Soviet troops were brought in at the request of the "legitimate Afghan government—the one that was in power at the time."

In the same interview Brezhnev listed a number of other factors that were also taken into account directly or indirectly when making the decision about Afghanistan: The NATO decision concerning the annual automatic increase of its members' military budgets until the end of the 20th century and the forcing through by the United States of the new long-term arms programs and the creation of "rapid deployment forces"—that instrument of the policy of military intervention—and the actual refusal on the part of the Carter administration to ratify the SALT-2 treaty which established strategic parity between the United States and the USSR. Although President Carter made a decision to "freeze" for an indefinite amount of time the consideration of the treaty in the U.S. Senate as though in response to the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, nonetheless even by the end of the autumn of 1979 it was quite obvious to all Soviet specialists who had kept track of the treaty's destiny as it was to all Soviet politicians that under the

conditions of the growth of anti-Sovietism in the United States the treaty would not be ratified. Finally, the Soviet leader also mentioned the NATO decision made in the middle of December to deploy more American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in a number of West European countries.

To this one should add—and I have mentioned this in my articles—the incipient "deal" (as it was perceived in the USSR at the time) between Washington and Beijing, which was following an anti-Soviet line at the time. The United States was actually trying to turn over to China "one big war," i.e. the war in Asia against the USSR which they themselves had eliminated from their, as it were, military strategy supposedly because of the Sino-Soviet split. This also gave the United States the opportunity to change over to planning military construction according to the optimum and not the maximum as would be the case if they had been dealing with a "Soviet-Chinese monolith." Another factor was the increased U.S. military activity on the southern borders of the Soviet Union and their preparations to invade Iran because of the Iranian revolution. What would have been left for the Soviet Union to do if the United States had carried out its intervention in Iran as was being planned in Washington at the time? Dispassionately observe that the United States was bringing its troops right up to the USSR border? Move its army to meet the U.S. forces, that is, engage them in an armed conflict? In this sense sending Soviet troops to Afghanistan actually neutralized the planned American operation against Iran, as is unambiguously recalled in the memoirs of Z. Brzezinski—at that time the leading ideologist of U.S. anti-Soviet strategy.

In the absence of documents it is difficult to say which of these considerations actually had an effect on the adoption of the decision to send in troops and which were merely used after the fact in order to justify this action. Perhaps the main consideration was the fact that Brezhnev, who warmly received and embraced Taraki in September of 1979 when he was traveling through Moscow, could not reconcile himself to the fact that only a couple of days later, upon his return to Kabul, Taraki was ousted from the post of president by H. Amin and then was cruelly killed on Amin's order. Moreover there is reason to think that the Moscow leadership at the time was extremely concerned about Amin's activity and his contacts with the United States and Pakistan along with his left-wing excesses in domestic policy which were reflected in repressive measures against party cadre, the intelligentsia, and the clergy. The fact that at one time Amin had studied in the United States was, with our customary suspiciousness, quite a sufficient reason to see him as an American spy who was prepared to invite American troops into the country, although in reality Amin was apparently a "left-winger" of the Polpotov ilk who strove mainly to increase his personal power and in so doing counted on compromises with Pakistan (which

was to have "taken in hand" the Afghan mojaheds who had begun to fight against the PDPA government) and also on...Soviet bayonets!

The fact that Amin actually asked Moscow to send troops made it possible to announce that the entry of a limited military contingent into Afghanistan was done at the request of the legal Afghan government, although during the process of this entry this legal government was transformed into an illegal government of "Aminian tyranny" against which the people rose up and which they overthrew. And from the very beginning this explanation was one of the weakest points of our propaganda campaign which was intended to substantiate and justify the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan on 27 December 1979.

There were also other weak points in this campaign.

On 23 December 1979 PRAVDA published a note by A. Maslennikov entitled "Behind the Scenes of Events" in which he sharply rebuffed the Western, especially American, mass media which spread utter fabrications...with the most malicious underlying motives" to the effect that Soviet military units had entered Afghan territory.

At that time there actually were no military units in Afghanistan but the publication of information of this kind just 4 days before the entry of Soviet troops clearly undermined whatever credibility subsequent communications from the Soviet mass media concerning Afghanistan may have had. Having received the appropriate command the press began to marshal all plausible and implausible arguments to substantiate the correctness and, moreover, the inevitability of such a move. They especially blamed the "foreign aggression" although there were no foreign troops on the territory of Afghanistan except for Soviet forces. The thesis of the need for us to have more reliable southern borders turned out to be extremely popular although it seems that it would be difficult to find a more reliable section—in the sense of the physical difficulty of crossing it—throughout the entire length of the USSR border. And although, as it turns out, in memos to the high Soviet leadership at that time some of the leaders of academic institutes tried to cast doubt on the expediency of this action, in the press there was no discussion of this, which was to be expected. And even now this discussion is just developing, although it is obvious that we shall not be able to avoid open discussion of this problem.

There is nothing to hide: To a certain extent the Soviet leadership at that time felt that the West was trying, as they say, to drive us into a corner, to put pressure on us, taking advantage also of the paralysis of this leadership itself caused by Brezhnev's helplessness in his old age and the stagnation that had been noted in the Soviet economy. Detente was derailed by the West—not without some "help" from us, to be candid. And Brezhnev was not exaggerating when he told that same PRAVDA correspondent: "For some time now it has been clear that the leading circles in the United States

and certain other NATO countries have entered upon a course that is hostile to the cause of detente, a course toward stirring up the arms race, which will lead to increased military danger."

Therefore when the Americans subsequently asked me, for example: "Did you not think about what would happen to detente if you sent troops into Afghanistan?" I answered that the Soviet leadership could hardly be especially concerned about detente since everything indicated clearly that another round of the Cold War had started. And war is war. But if the war was only a "cold" one—since because of the nature of existing arms, it was no longer possible to wage a "hot war"—it was necessary to use precisely "cold war" methods. And when they try to "drive you into a corner," it is necessary to take a step, make a move, or change a course of action which will show your opponents that you were not born yesterday either, that you can hold your own and, when appropriate, give the proper response. This can also explain to a certain degree the entry—at precisely that difficult time—of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Explain but not justify, the more so since it would have been possible to find a different, no less effective but more reasonable way of demonstrating our firmness, our confidence in our power. But regardless of how many different explanations we may have found for this action, there no justification for it!

First of all, the decision, which directly affected the fates of Soviet people, was made in private, in secret from the people by a couple of the country's highest leaders. As E.A. Shevardnadze said in an interview with an IZVESTIYA correspondent, "at that time I was a candidate member of the Central Committee Politburo and like several of my comrades and colleagues I was simply presented with the fact." For a long time the Soviet people were simply not told that Soviet troops were conducting military actions in Afghanistan, that soldiers and officers were dying in war. Hospitals in Uzbekistan and many other regions of the country were filled with wounded but it seemed that nobody knew about it. Certain rare remarks in the speeches of leaders about the war were inevitably accompanied by references to the 'bandit formations' with whom, naturally, in the presence of the Soviet troops, the Afghan people would have to deal quickly and resolutely. And indeed as early as June 1980, only 6 months after the entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, Moscow declared authoritatively to all the world: 'Now life in Afghanistan will gradually return to normal. The large bands of counterrevolutionaries have been routed and the interventionists have sustained a serious defeat. Under these conditions we made a decision to withdraw some of our military contingent from Afghanistan.' But the war, as we know, continued for almost 9 more years with the participation of Soviet troops and it continues to this day without their participation."

The private nature of the decision to send in the troops was not the only mistake. In spite of Brezhnev's statement to the effect that when sending the troops to

Afghanistan the leaders all the circumstances, the consequences of this decision were not thoroughly thought through.

It is clear that no realistic analysis of the Afghan events was conducted either. It was and is a civil war in Afghanistan. Not a war of "mercenaries against the people" whereby some carry out aggression from abroad while others "defend the homeland," but precisely a civil, fratricidal war, as F.A. Shevardnadze calls it, during the course of which each of the sides thinks that it is the one protecting the interests of the homeland.

No, this is not good—from our standpoint—and it might even be strange that there is a war against a progressive government which wishes the Afghan people nothing but good, which wishes to put an end to the remnants of feudalism, and so forth. This is somehow unnatural. But at the same time it is quite obvious that no-one except the people themselves, the majority of them, has the right to decide what is a blessing and what is not. And, understandably, nobody from the outside has the authority to do this. A considerable share of the population in Afghanistan, if one counts those who have fled beyond the cordon, have spoken out against the policies established by the PDPA government in Kabul. And let us look the truth in the eye: The opposition arose not from the outside but from within Afghanistan itself. If we were speaking about some bandits operating in hostile surroundings from a foreign territory than, naturally, there would have been no problem in suppressing these forces, and foreign troops would not have been needed to carry out this task. But we are speaking about the fact that a certain part of the Afghans has not accepted the new authority and is waging a battle against it. Even if they are ignorant, unaware, and, as it seems from the outside, cannot see their own lot in life, still they want to live in the old way. They are undoubtedly waging their battle with assistance and support from the outside, mainly from the United States, but also from Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, China, Pakistan, and a number of other countries. Without this support, possibly, the resistance of these forces would not have been so significant and effective. But the fact that in 11 years of war—from the time of the April revolution—the powerful forces of the regular Afghan army, with the active participation of Soviet forces in military operations, did not manage either to radically cut off supply routes of the insurgents or to suppress their resistance within the country shows that the "irreconcilable opposition" is not simply the "gang of bandits" we have passed them off as but a real force with which it is also necessary to conduct diplomatic negotiations on the subject of its possible participation in a coalition government. Such negotiations are not conducted with bandits.

And although Afghanistan, naturally, is not Vietnam, still some of the negative experience acquired by the United States could apply to us if we thought about it. As the late Charles Yost, an eminent American diplomat, wrote: "One of the lessons of the last 15 years that was most clearly manifested in the Vietnam war was the fact

that the ability of even the strongest power to intervene effectively in the affairs of other states has been eaten away by time, space, and history...." "The most decisive lesson of Vietnam," Yost stated, "is that regardless of the forces the United States may apply, they will not be able to provide for the security of a country whose government is not capable of mobilizing and maintaining enough support from the population to be able to cope with an uprising... If local dissidents, be they communists or noncommunists, whether they have assistance from outside or not, are capable of mobilizing more effective popular support than the existing government, they will ultimately win out. The United States will not be able to stand in their way even if it wants to and even if it is ready for a certain amount of time to expend life and resources for the sake of achieving this goal."

So the euphemism of the situation **around** in reality simply concealed an unwillingness to realistically analyze the situation in Afghanistan itself and to draw the corresponding conclusions. It is paradoxical but it is a fact: Now that the situation related to peaceful regulation in the country after the withdrawal of Soviet troops is indeed increasingly being transformed into a situation **around** Afghanistan, our press has begun to write about the situation in Afghanistan.

When I think about the war in Afghanistan and our participation in it I am reminded of some lines of our great national poet N.A. Nekrasov, which were uttered, true, with respect to Russian agriculture which have a broader meaning as well. He wrote:

A sad sight: the hungry horse
On the exhausted soil,
With the hungry ploughman... But touch
With an inexperienced hand—
Something even sadder
Will obtain in the end...

It is with this kind of "inexperienced hand" that we got into Afghanistan, as the Americans got into Cambodia, and the Palestinians and Israelis got into Lebanon, and disturbed the delicate balance of forces (ethnic groups, religions, clans) that had existed for centuries, and made it more difficult to restore or even change this balance through local means and methods and thus ignored a fundamental principle of freedom of choice, one whose unwavering observance we are now actively promoting and which in principle we have never denied before. Let us recall Brezhnev again: When announcing the entry of Soviet forces into Afghanistan he read a note to those "who have a deep-seated habit of conducting themselves unceremoniously with other states and acting in the international arena as though everything were permitted." But in reality we were condemning the right to intervention only when it was assumed by other countries while retaining this "right" for ourselves. To speak frankly, this position of ours finally put an end to the *détente* of the seventies and led the USSR-U.S. competition in the direction of confrontation again.

What negative consequences—political, economic, and moral—did our participation in the war in Afghanistan bring to us?

First of all it led to a situation where the image of the USSR as an expansionist power which is always striving for conquests, one which propaganda in the West has been creating for years, seems to have been given real support. And no declarations about the internationalist nature of our troops' mission could dispel this opinion.

We have ended up in a difficult position with respect to this issue in the United Nations, most of whose members voted against the USSR when adopting resolutions regarding the Afghan issue. Instead of drawing the proper conclusions from this, we started to accuse the United Nations of "grossly trampling on the sovereign right of the Afghan people," although it was the United Nations with the help of the negotiations mechanism it created that ultimately made a significant contribution to the cause of regulation in Afghanistan.

Because of our actions in Afghanistan we have quarreled with a number of Muslim countries and evoked condemnation of our actions from the nonaligned movement and even certain friendly parties.

We ourselves have created a "built-in" obstacle on the path to regulation of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Under the conditions of a situation with consumer and food commodities on the domestic market that was difficult to begin with we have burdened ourselves with colossal additional expenditures associated with military operations and economic aid to Afghanistan. The Soviet people are still unaware of the amounts of these expenditures. But one can assume that if Washington, Islamabad, and Riyadh invested many billions of dollars in aid to the mujaheds, we have invested at least as much.

We have put a real scare into the West which, in spite of our regular denials, saw in our sending our troops across the Pakistan border the most convincing confirmation of the truth of the alarmist prophecies made by various kinds of "Russian specialists" about the "inevitability of a Soviet military upsurge toward the oil fields of the Near East, regardless of how threatening these prophecies may have seemed to us ourselves. This consolidated the West with a new anti-Soviet standoff, and strengthened the pro-West inclination in the policy at that time of Beijing and a number of other Asian countries.

Instead of a neutral, nonaligned state with a traditionally friendly attitude on the part of all segments of the population toward the "good neighbor in the north," we have ended up with a divided country with seething passions with millions of dead and with one-third of the population having fled abroad—to Pakistan and Iran, with a destroyed economy, and undermined water supply system, a hostile population, and an increasingly strong influence of gloomy obscurantist religious trends.

The many years of propagandistic lies about what was happening in Afghanistan (and remaining silent about the events is also a kind of lie) shook the moral principles of the Soviet people, made many into cynics, and contributed to the dissemination of an attitude toward the men fighting in Afghanistan which, judging from the letters being published now, is expressed in the phrase of a bureaucrat, the dining room chief, and sometimes even the physician: "What has that to do with me—after all, I did not send you there!" Those who deal directly with our men who fought in Afghanistan sometimes reach extremes of indifference and immorality for which there are few analogs in world literature. I have in mind the Shylockian demands placed on our men fighting in Afghanistan, about whom it was said in our press that they should "make reimbursement" many times over for the bullet-proof jacket lost in a combat raid, for the overalls that were cut into pieces in the hospital from the body of a barely living soldier because there was no other way to render him aid.

And what was the "plus" side of our actions?

As was said above, it is possible that the entry of our troops into Afghanistan played a certain role in preventing American armed intervention in Iran. But it would also have been possible to achieve that through diplomatic levers and warning Washington that such an action could lead to a direct military confrontation between the United States and the USSR. At the same time the fact that Soviet troops were conducting combat activities in Afghanistan undoubtedly weakened the world reaction of protest to the mass entry of U.S. military ships into the Persian Gulf in 1987.

Our troops received their military tempering in Afghanistan, our military equipment was tested and adjusted there, and our tactics for combat operations were adjusted there to work in mountainous terrain against irregular units. But the price for this experience, paid with the lives of 15,000 of our soldiers and the health of tens of thousands of others, was too great, the more so since even under Brezhnev and Chernenko we had no intention of conducting local wars on a regular basis! This is actually all that can be said about the "positive" side of the Afghan experience.

The task now is to restore peace in Afghanistan. As Ahmad and Barnet correctly write in their article, the Geneva agreements give the United States and the USSR the opportunity to cooperate in the restoration of Afghanistan and the creation of a stable peace in this region, an unprecedented chance, as they say, to test the possibility of positive joint actions. And if the American side will set aside the desire it has had throughout its past to do as much damage as it can to Moscow and will approach the matter reasonably and responsibly, then the kind of Soviet-American cooperation in the region called for by Ahmad and Barnet could indeed stop another round of "bloody games" in the struggle for power in Afghanistan itself.

The solution to the Afghanistan problem again requires a sober, businesslike approach from us as well. Having fought in Afghanistan for more than 9 years trying to stabilize the current Afghan regime and leaving it without having achieved this stabilization, it is naive to seriously count on the idea that the Afghan government, which was unable to strengthen its authority even with the our colossal military aid, could continue to function successfully in the absence of Soviet troops. I shall allow myself to express the seditious idea that without our help in the form of the entry of our troops in 1979 the PDPA government would have had a chance of staying in power—whether its leader be Amin, Karmal, or anyone else if it had conducted a reasonable policy from the very beginning. By balancing itself among various factions, making certain concessions to Pakistan—in exchange for concessions from the latter—and appealing to India and the countries of Europe, the regime could possibly have stabilized the situation. This idea came to me from an interview with Army General V.I. Varennikov for the magazine OGONEK. The general, who for the past 4 years has been in charge of the work of the Operations Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan, speaks in this interview about the mistake, the attempt to use force to put down the popular authority in the regions of the country that in principle were not hostile to the central government and were not actively opposing it. This pertained to many regions of this semifuedal country where the rule was in the hands of local tribal chieftains who were used to living independently and not taking orders from anyone. In this mosaic balance of clans and territories under the control of local shahs and other rulers lies the essence of the social fabric in Afghanistan. "Naturally," said Varennikov, "they are going to oppose anyone who comes to them with weapons in hand and installs their own authority through force. Supporting the leadership of Afghanistan, during those first years of the war we assumed that in order to spread popular authority it was necessary to 'plant' in one district or another an **organizational nucleus** of this authority. But the residents would never voluntarily allow this authority into their villages (especially when it is brought in at the point of foreign bayonets.—G.T.). Therefore the troops and the weapons had to be used: Anywhere where there was resistance force was applied. In order to protect the **organizational nucleus** of 'popular' (quotation marks were in the original—G.T.) authority, a military unit was stationed in the district and certain comrades hastened to report that 'another region has been liberated from the ghosts.' Absurd? Of course!" And where were the Soviet Afghanistan specialists in this situation, even if they were not consulted for the initial decision to send in the troops? Or are there any such specialists at all?

And what was the result? The result was what could have been expected, although the general did not mention this. The central government and the Soviet troops who supported it, instead of sporadic seats of resistance, were faced with an antigovernment and—let us be frank—an anti-Soviet uprising in the scale of the entire country.

This is what happens when you act with an "inexperienced hand"! Under these conditions, how real was the national reconciliation effected by this government?

Instead of asking this question and discussing possible realistic alternatives (and, after all, even President Najibullah announced through his representative, as it was reported in the newspapers, that he was ready to step down from power for the sake of achieving reconciliation), the majority of our commentators with indescribable gloating undertook, as they say, "egg on" (I cannot think of a better word) the mujaheds, from day to day flinging at them from the pages of the Soviet press such phrases as: Who are you weaklings who threatened to put an end to the Kabul government in a couple of days, and here weeks have passed and you have not yet taken a single decent city? I do not think that this kind of commentary, which inflames passions, can be said to contribute to national reconciliation. But perhaps they are veiled evidence of the conviction that with this distribution of forces national reconciliation is impossible?

The endless search for more and more new outside obstacles to regulation does not contribute to a realistic approach either. The nonconstructive position of the United States, which signed the Geneva agreements, Islamabad's tolerance of the camps and Mujahed support points on Pakistani territory and their aid with arms—these are one thing. These are real obstacles. The complexity of the situation on the Afghan-Pakistani border was undoubtedly exacerbated by the fact that a number of tribes and tribal groupings have "straddled" this border and are encamped on both sides of it. As concerns "Pakistani aggression," such proofs of its existence as, for example, the TASS report from Kabul of 29 March 1989 could hardly convince the readers to a greater degree than the "proof" whipped up in our reports in 1980 to substantiate the thesis of "external aggression." The aforementioned announcement said: "The recent capture on Afghan territory of two officers of Pakistani military intelligence tells of Pakistan's **broad military intervention and aggression**. It is somehow difficult to believe that Benazir Bhutto's government, faced as it is with a mass of the most difficult social and political domestic problems, which has complicated, as it is not fashionable to express it, relations with India, which is clearly not interested in quarreling with the USSR, could not find anything better to do than begin a broad-scale aggression against Afghanistan. And is this not another case of the traditional journalistic stereotype of explaining our own mistakes and failures or the mistakes of our friends by using the standard references to either spies or external enemies?

(The discussion is continued in the next issue.)

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Problems with U.S. Nuclear Weapons Plants Discussed

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[Article by Igor Fedorovich Bocharov, candidate of technical sciences, senior scientific associate-consultant of ISKAN, and Aleksey Alekseyevich Vasilyev, doctor of jurisprudence, ISKAN department chief: "Problems of the Nuclear Complex"]

[Text] Until recently the rank-and-file American living far from the main centers of the production of nuclear weapons, testing grounds, and storage facilities for them had the impression that all was well in this area. The reports that made their way through from time to time about disorders in the warehouses and leakage of radioactive gases during nuclear testing did not spoil this picture. At the end of last year the growing number of articles in the open press and the alarm of the people living around the centers for the production of nuclear weapons erased this picture of well-being. Today it is thought that among the most difficult problems inherited by the new U.S. President George Bush, one of the most significant—after the budget deficit, of course—is the insurance of safe functioning of the outdated infrastructure for the production of nuclear weapons.¹ Public demands to bring facilities intended for the production of nuclear weapons and testing grounds in line with environmental protection legislation in effect in atomic energy immediately made the administration face the problem of allotting large amounts of money for these purposes.

At the present time about 90,000 people are employed in the production, development, and also the research work involved with the creation of a nuclear weapon. A total of about 7-8 billion dollars are allotted annually for the storage of existing kinds of nuclear weapons and the creation of new ones. According to data of the Council for the Protection of Natural Resources, from 1985 through 1990 the United States will produce more than 1,800 nuclear warheads of 10 different types while another 18 are in the stage of development. In 1986 a full list of nuclear arms included 71 kinds of nuclear warheads used in 116 different combat systems.

The distribution of the main elements of the infrastructure for the production of nuclear weapons is given in figure 1.²

In its totality this infrastructure, which is located in 13 states, includes four national research laboratories, 11 enterprises for producing nuclear fuel, and the Nevada testing ground. The assembly of series-produced nuclear ammunition and their transfer to the Armed Forces are done at a single plant—Pentax (in the state of Texas). Experimental models are created at the U-12 Plant (the state of Tennessee).

The situation that has developed at the present time with respect to environmental pollution at enterprises of the


nuclear complex, according to data from the report of the U.S. Department of Energy, which is responsible for the development and production of nuclear weapons, is depicted in figure 2.³

Practically all of these enterprises and even to national research laboratories—Livermore (in the state of California) and Los Alamos (in the state of New Mexico)—are sources of pollution of underground waters and the atmosphere with both radioactive and highly toxic chemical wastes. Representatives of the international movement of physicians for preventing nuclear war hope to clarify the correlation that undoubtedly exists between the amounts of radioactive discharge in the regions where nuclear weapons are produced and the risk of increased cancer diseases and genetic disturbances among workers of these enterprises and the local population.

The state of affairs is clearly unfavorable and dangerous to people's health at enterprises of the U.S. nuclear complex, which were constructed mainly during the forties and fifties when there was no serious evaluation of the scale of the influence of the applied technologies on the environment. This evoked from the broad public, the press, and the Congress sharp criticism of the defense and energy departments for their lack of desire to obey the environmental protection laws.

At the demand of the leading critic of the energy department in congress, John Glenn (a Democrat from the state of Ohio), the chairman of the Senate committee for questions of the activity of government agencies, this department estimated the expenditures necessary to clean up the radioactive and chemical pollutants from nuclear weapons plants and other military and civilian facilities under its supervision. According to the estimates, from 53 billion to 92 billion dollars might be needed for these purposes. But J. Glenn thinks that in the report on the results of the research the energy department lowered the figures for the cleanup and this is not the first time it has done so. He also stated that "evidence of the government's willingness to clean up these facilities will be not this report but the amount that is actually allocated and spent for this work."⁴ According to data of the American press, which is based on the energy department's report on modernization of the complex for producing nuclear weapons (the so-called 2010 Report), before the year 2010 this modernization and restoration of the environment, safety measures, and public health will take more than 200 billion dollars (in 1990 prices). This sum approaches all the expenditures of the U.S. government (250 billion dollars in 1988 prices) on the creation of the complex for developing, producing, and testing nuclear weapons during the more than 4 decades since the time of the Manhattan Project. The proposed increase of expenditures of the energy department during the next 20 years will amount to a total of 81 billion dollars⁵ in addition to the current approximately 8 billion dollars allotted annually for nuclear weapons, which means an increase in expenditures by an average factor of 1.5.

Distribution of Nuclear Arsenal Throughout Country



Research laboratories A. Los Alamos National Laboratory. Research specialization: development and testing of nuclear weapons. B. White Sands [Sandiyskiy] National Laboratory. Research specialization: development and testing of nonnuclear components of nuclear weapons. C. Livermore Lawrence National Laboratory. Research specialization: development and testing of nuclear weapons. D. Pacific Ocean Northwest Laboratory. Research specialization: Leadership of work with production wastes. **Industrial enterprises**

1. Hanford Nuclear Storage Facility: Before it was closed in 1988 reactor N here produced plutonium for nuclear weapons. It processes used fuel elements in order to extract the uranium so that it can be used again and processes the plutonium into metal. 2. Idaho National Technical Laboratory. Processing of depleted nuclear fuel into new fuel for the Savannah River enterprise; storage of nuclear wastes until they are sent for permanent burial. 3. Rocky Flats Plant. Manufactures plutonium triggers for nuclear weapons. 4. Kansas City Plant. Manufactures nonnuclear components such as electrical systems and telemetric equipment. 5. Mound Enterprise. Manufactures nonnuclear components, including detonators and temporary devices. Dismantles tritium containers for regeneration of wastes. 6. Ashtabula Processing Plant. Manufactures from uranium ingots pipes to be used as fuel elements and targets for radiation in production reactors. 7. The production center for supplying materials. Processes uranium into metal ingots or small bars for subsequent processing into fuel elements and targets for production reactors. 8. The Oak Ridge storage facility (plant U-12). Manufactures nuclear components, enriches uranium and plutonium, and manufactures experimental models of nuclear weapons. 9. The Savannah River Plant. Produces tritium, plutonium, and highly enriched uranium. In 1990 it is planned to open there a plant which will mix wastes with a high level of radioactivity with glass for permanent storage. 10. Pinellas [Paynlas] Plant. Manufactures special electronic components for nuclear weapons, including neutron generators. 11. Pentax Plant. Assembles nuclear weapons from components manufactured in other places. Is responsible for service and disassembly of weapons. 12. Nevada Testing Grounds. Tests nuclear weapons. Is used for burial of wastes with low levels of radioactivity and mixed wastes. Note: Tests in the atmosphere were conducted from several islands and coral reefs in the Pacific Ocean called the Central Pacific Ocean site (the Johnston coral reef and Marshall Islands) during the forties and fifties. Although tests have not been conducted there since 1957, the Department of Energy regards this site as an operational part of the nuclear complex.

Beginning with the 1990 fiscal year expenditures should increase, reaching a peak in the 1995 fiscal year—12.5 billion dollars. It is planned to divide the additional allocations in half: 50 percent directly for the production of nuclear weapons and 50 percent for environmental protection and public health.

As a result an annual average of more than 10 billion dollars will be spent directly on nuclear weapons and about 2 billion dollars on environmental protection and public health (at the present time it is approximately 1 billion dollars).

But according to the data of the American press, during the next 20 years the restoration of the environment and the provision of long-term storage for radioactive wastes will take 65 billion dollars, i.e. almost three times more than envisioned in the energy department report.⁶

Thus concerning the question of further production of nuclear weapons, tension is being created in the relations between the administration represented by the energy and defense departments, on the one hand, and Congress and the broad public, on the other.



Byproducts of the bomb: pollution and nuclear enterprises

Research laboratories

A. *Los Alamos National Laboratory*. Tests that are conducted pollute the test site with uranium. Chemical substances and radioactive particles precipitate out to the ground.

B. *White Sands National Laboratory*. Near the Nevada testing grounds the desert is polluted with dangerous materials which have been used in the laboratories since the beginning of the forties. Underground containers leak and open ponds contain polluted wastes and can release them into the ground.

C. *Livermore Lawrence National Laboratory*. One of the main arms laboratories. Toxic pollutants seep through the ground into the ground waters. It is assumed that the pollution is spreading to nearby population points through the ground waters.

Industrial enterprises 1. *Hanford storage facility*. Liquid radioactive and toxic wastes were discharged into the ditches from its opening in 1944 until the beginning of the eighties. These wastes infected large underground reservoirs used for drinking and irrigation. 2. *Idaho National Technical Laboratory*. The plant that processes nuclear fuel and operates experimental reactors has discharged radioactive and toxic wastes into the pond for wastes, which does not have the proper impermeable casing. Therefore the wastes go into the Snake River aquifer, a gigantic underground reservoir. 3. *The Rocky Flats Plant*. The plant, which releases plutonium for arms, produces volatile carcinogenic organic chemicals into the underground waters north of Denver. The soil around the plant's location is polluted with plutonium. 4. *The Kansas City Plant*. The plant, which produces electronic components for arms, has polluted the soil and sewage system by dumping carcinogenic substances into pits. The plant has also discharged 240 tons of toxic chemicals into the atmosphere. 5. *The Mound Enterprise*. Pits full of wastes on the territory of the plant,

which produces highly explosive substances and plutonium components for satellites, can leak toxic chemicals into the ground. 6. *The Ashtabula Processing Plant*. No data. 7. *The production center for supplying materials*. Two mines have been filled with 390,000 cubic feet of radioactive wastes which emit the lethal gas radon. The plant has also discharged 300,000 pounds of uranium oxide and polluted drinking water sources. 8. *The Oak Ridge Storage Facility (U-12 plant)*. The plant produces arms components. It has already polluted the streams with mercury. The pond at the plant contains arsenic, boron, and sulfate that have seeped into the surface waters. Agricultural crops and animal husbandry products can be polluted with toxic discharges into the atmosphere. 9. *The Savannah River Plant*. The plant, which produces radioactive tritium and plutonium for nuclear weapons, as a result an accident discharged millions of curies of tritium gas into the atmosphere. The main natural water resources have been polluted with the solvents. 10. *The Pinellas Plant*. Produces mechanical components for weapons. People think that the underground reservoirs, which contain chemical impurities, are leaking. 11. *The Pentax Plant*. From 1954 through 1980 thousands of gallons of toxic solvents were discharged from the plant, which does the final assembly of warheads, into an immense waste container which did not have the proper impermeable lining. People think that the chemical substances are seeping into the main sources of drinking water for the city of Amarillo. 12. *Nevada Testing Ground*. About 75 square miles are basically polluted with radioactive materials from surface and underground testing, including plutonium, caesium, and strontium. *Enterprises of military and civilian significance. The Portsmouth complex for enriching uranium*. Approximately 36 pounds of carcinogenic and toxic hexavalent chromium, used in the process of enriching uranium for nuclear fuel, are annually discharged into the atmosphere through plant cooling columns.

As before, the administration will try to provide for a high level of production of nuclear weapons to the detriment of the environment and human health since a different approach is blocked as long as the nuclear arms race continues by the large financial expenditures which might be more than they can afford. When drawing up Report 2010 the basic assumption was that nuclear arms would continue to be the principal element of U.S. security in the foreseeable future.

In past years only two types of fuel necessary for creating nuclear and thermonuclear weapons have been produced have been produced at nuclear complexes of the energy department: plutonium-239 and tritium. Plutonium is produced in reactors in Hanford (Washington state) and at Savannah River (South Carolina) plutonium and tritium. Plutonium is also processed at the Rocky Flats plant (Colorado). At the present time, because of the lack of correspondence between the requirements of the laws for safety and environmental protection, the operation of these enterprises has been halted.

If there is no special danger of a shortage of plutonium-239, a fairly stable element that is available in sufficient quantities in the United States, the situation with tritium⁷ is estimated as critical since it is a necessary component of thermonuclear weapons whose supplies will continuously decrease if production is halted. Now the only industrial installations for obtaining tritium—three nuclear reactors at the Savannah River plant—have been closed.

Many American experts think that if none of the reactors in Savannah River is started up before summer (according to information from the press, this is extremely probably), there will be a need to augment supplies of tritium for the warheads with higher priorities at the expense of the less important ones.

But even if they manage to satisfy the need for tritium in the immediate future, over the longer range its deliveries will still be questionable. Obsolete reactors of the Savannah River complex will still be in use at the beginning of the 21st century, when the government hopes to complete the construction of two new reactors for producing tritium at a cost of 6.8 billion dollars⁸—a heavy-water installation in Savannah River and a high temperature gas-cooled installation at the Idaho National Technical Laboratory near the city of Idaho Falls.

Taking into account the possible shortage of tritium in the next decade, the energy department is considering three options:

to conduct scientific research work on using civilian reactors for producing tritium for military purposes—a step which will require the removal of the ban placed by Congress on the utilization of civilian reactors for such purposes;⁹

the adoption of an extreme program for changing two of the Hanford reactors over to the production of tritium, however this production would be very costly and would produce a relatively small amount of tritium;

modification and beginning of operation of a nuclear energy station at Hanford that has been closed because of security considerations, which will take at least 4 years;

the purchase of tritium from Canada, Great Britain, or France. But such an approach is not attractive to American specialists either in the near or distant future;

the utilization of the agreement that was developed concerning a 50-percent reduction of long-range nuclear weapons. According to the estimates of one of the representatives of the administration, in keeping with the earmarked provisions of the agreement, in 7 years 3,000-4,000 units of American nuclear weapons will be eliminated. The overall quantity of tritium released will possibly give the United States a 2-3-year supply.

Thus the elimination of the tritium shortage is a fairly complicated and costly affair. This circumstance, in turn, gave impetus to the discussion of the previously

expressed idea of eliminating or significantly reducing stocks of nuclear weapons through reducing the production of tritium for military purposes.¹⁰

It is superfluous to say that curtailing the production of materials that are fissionable materials for nuclear ammunition would exert a colossal influence on the limitation of the nuclear arms race. Halting the production of plutonium and enriched uranium would make it possible to establish the upper limit on the quantity of nuclear ammunition since the production of new weapons would be possible only by dismantling old ones and processing the fissionable materials contained in them. Banning tritium production would be even more promising: Its natural disintegration would make it necessary eventually to halt the production of nuclear weapons. If these restrictions were also accompanied by a nuclear test ban, in reality the totality of these measures would mean complete halting of the creation of nuclear weapons.

With respect to the applicability of this idea for the reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States, however, American specialists express the following misgivings:¹¹

prohibiting the production of tritium is difficult to monitor since reactors for civilian nuclear energy can be used for its production;

the nuclear powers can return to arms without tritium (the first generation of atomic weapons) with which they were armed 20 years ago. In the opinion of specialists these weapons have less of a danger of possible random detonation;

curtailment or reduction of the production of tritium and the use of heavier nuclear weapons can produce advantages for the USSR since it has more powerful rockets;

with only heavy warheads at their disposal, preference will be given to earth-based rockets over rockets based on submarines, which can become a destabilizing factor since earth-based rockets are more vulnerable to the first attack and in a crisis situation the military and political leadership will be faced with a dilemma: either use them immediately or lose them.

Thus at the present time a unique situation is developing in the United States for broad discussion of the problem of curtailing the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, which might become the material foundation for the elimination of these weapons.

It is obvious that the new administration will be seriously in opposition to public opinion and, to a certain degree, to congress in questions of nuclear strategy. On the one hand, public opinion is developing in favor of curtailing the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. This is based on serious misgivings about the fate of the world, the health of the population, and the protection of the environment for posterity. The

immense expenditures that are required for more or less safe technologies for the production of nuclear fuel dispel the myth about how "highly economical" nuclear weapons are.

On the other hand it is possible that the new administration will be against halting the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, relying on small, highly effective thermonuclear weapons, on the basis of which they are also conducting intensive development of nuclear weapons of the third generation which is characterized by the possibility of controlling its destructive factors and selective direction of their effect. Therefore the appearance of the "tritium crisis"—if one might call it that—against the background of the complicated and costly health-protection and ecological problems cannot simply be considered an adequate factor for limiting or halting the production of tritium and other kinds of nuclear fuel. But one can say with confidence that the "tritium crisis" will not go unnoticed when the real state of affairs in the nuclear complex is evaluated.

In the opinion of the American press, the energy department cannot continue to neglectfully produce nuclear fuel. And the defense department must begin to pay out of its own budget for nuclear materials for the arms it orders. This would force the defense department to share the responsibility for the activity of the nuclear complex.

Characterizing the situation in the area of nuclear weapon production as a whole, it should be noted that the problem of the feasibility of continuing the nuclear arms race is being discussed so broadly and deeply for the first time in the almost half-century history of the existence of this "superweapon." This discussion is undoubtedly significant as a stage on the path to making the public aware of the need for the most rapid elimination of the entire nuclear arms infrastructure. It is also important that the current discussions on the basis of broad public awareness through the press of the socially significant aspects of nuclear weapon production.

Even today it is clear that opponents of halting or at least cutting back the production of nuclear fuel, in order to justify their position, will be extensively taking advantage of the thesis of the unilateral advantages the USSR would allegedly have if such a policy were realized. An essential element of their position will be the argument about the lack of information about the structure of such production in the USSR. The informational "asymmetry" will undoubtedly be emphasized by the fact that the public in the United States and other countries are well informed both about the American weapon production infrastructure itself and about the state of affairs with respect to questions of safety techniques and environmental protection in the country. Therefore, although the solution to the problem is still unclear, the retention of the status quo with this "asymmetry" will only play into the hands of opponents of lowering the level of the nuclear standoff.

As concerns the real position of the USSR in questions of production of materials for nuclear arms, as M.S. Gorbachev announced during his visit to Great Britain in April 1989, we recently "made a decision to halt the production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes this year. In addition to the industrial reactor for producing plutonium for weapons which was closed in 1987, this year and next year we plan to close down two more such reactors and we shall not introduce new capacities to replace them. This is another large step toward completely halting production of fissionable materials for arms."

Footnotes

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 9 Dec 1988.
2. THE WASHINGTON POST, 26 November 1988.
3. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 7 December 1988.
4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 5 January 1989.
5. U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report. Executive Summary, 15 December 1988.
6. THE WASHINGTON POST, 26 November 1988.
7. Tritium is an artificially obtained radioactive isotope of hydrogen which is produced in special nuclear reactors. Since tritium has a short half life (about 12.5 years, i.e. approximately 5.5 percent of the tritium annually turns into helium), it is necessary to augment it constantly, including that in thermonuclear weapons that are in storage. According to data of the open press, the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal, which amounts to approximately 22,000 units of ammunition (produced and in storage), contains about 100 kilograms of tritium.
8. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 11 December 1988.
9. This possibility ensues from the presidential directive of 18 November 1988 concerning the use of civilian reactors for military purposes under the conditions of "national extraordinary technological circumstance."
10. See, for example, NEW SCIENTIST, 1984, No 1397, pp 27-32.
11. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 11 December 1988.

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BACK TO THE PROBLEM

Further on Comparison of U.S., Soviet Living Standards

18030012e Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 89 pp 114-127

[Readers' responses to article in SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 12, 1988 by A.S. Zaychenko, "United States-USSR: Private Consumption (Some Comparisons)" and replies by A.S. Zaychenko, candidate of economic sciences: "More About Private Consumption in the USSR and the United States"]

[Text] The article by Candidate of Economic Sciences A.S. Zaychenko published in No 12 for last year, "United States-USSR: Private Consumption (Some Comparisons)" evoked numerous responses from our readers, including critical ones. Below are our readers' letters slightly abridged and A.S. Zaychenko's response to them.

The article by A.S. Zaychenko (No 12, 1988) actually refutes not only the data of the USSR State Committee for Statistics (formerly Central Statistical Administration) but also raises doubts about logicality about the revolutionary movement in Russia on the eve of Great October... The statistical annuals report that in 1913 the per capita meat consumption in the cities of the Russian empire averaged 29 kilograms, and for workers—20 kilograms. What was the problem? There is an equal lack of clarity about the correctness of John Reed's words in his book "Ten Days That Shook the World," which journalists frequently refer to (particularly KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA), to the effect that in 1913 the worker could purchase (more precisely, could buy on a regular basis) 3 kilograms of meat a day with his wages! And this is with the devalued money and the hunger which resulted in the uprising of the worker movement!! Which information should we believe, and who is responsible for the lie?

M.Ye. Kardasevich, economist and propagandist
Moscow

I have spent many days sitting and studying the statistics for the production and consumption of meat products in prerevolutionary Russia, in our country, and in modern America.

Meat consumption in the United States is determined in the following way: From its gross production they subtract all the byproducts, suet, and internal fat (lard), and from what is left after that they subtract meat to be used for nonfood purposes and for export, and they add the weight of meat purchased through imports and take into account the difference between weight of meat products that are carried over from the preceding year and left for consumption in the next year. The same system was used for calculating the meat products in prerevolutionary

Russia and the USSR before 1929. The actual consumption was corrected by regular investigations of representative groups of the population in the cities and in the rural areas.

A.S. Zaychenko used the same kind of accounting. The objections of the USSR State Committee for Statistics are based on the modern system that is used for accounting, and it differs significantly both from the American one and the previous Russian one.

Here, incidentally, it is appropriate to recall an interesting case: In 1934, intending to cover up the catastrophic decline in animal husbandry as a result of the forced collectivization of the peasantry, Stalin gave an instruction to the USSR Central Statistical Administration to find for 1928-1929 an indicator of gross meat production which would have no analogs in the statistics of previous years. Thus there appeared both a new method and the Stalinist "base" which took into account the weight of the meat, which included practically everything except the hide, intestines, and horns and hooves of the animal. Against this "background" even the failures almost looked like achievements. Naturally, the statistical reports were more accurate before 1929.

In my opinion, there is no justification for the State Committee for Statistics to argue so vigorously about the comparison of the levels of meat consumption at the end of the twenties and now. I think A.S. Zaychenko is right in this. I shall give some additional figures for reflection.

At the beginning of 1929 for every 100 residents of the country there were 44.5 head of cattle and at the beginning of 1988—42.3, including cows—20.3 and 14.7, respectively (let us note, incidentally, that it was impossible to keep barren cows on the peasant farms, while in our herd 26-28 out of every 100 cows are barren). The figure for sheep and goats was 96.2 and dropped to 51.6. There were 22.2 horses, of which no less than one-fourth were for meat. Moreover there were camels and donkeys, some of which were also consumed as food; now there are none of them at all. The current situation is better only with respect to the number of head of hogs. But this is balanced out to a considerable degree by the fact that the meat now includes 3 million tons of poultry and poultry meat was not taken into account at all in previous statistics and thus the quantity was lower than it is at present.

In a word, I think that disputes are necessary—and refutations are necessary. But the main thing is the analysis of the factors that led to the reduction of the number of head of livestock by half and the sharp drop in their meat productivity in the thirties. The country was not able to make up for these losses until the end of the fifties, and then it was with the help of "modern" methods of statistical reporting. And the disclosure of these factors is required in order, without repeating the mistakes of the past or making them worse, to determine ways of restoring rational and effective land use.

V.A. Tikhonov, VASKhNIL academician

A magnificent article by A.S. Zaychenko, "United States-USSR: Private Consumption," was published in issue No 12 of your magazine for 1988. I have been a propagandist for decades and am familiar with practically all the USSR literature regarding this issue. But never before has there been such a pithy article. But you yourselves are very well aware of this. Thank you!

But here is the problem. The article is presented as fact—and that is all there is to it. And on the basis of these facts there can be only one conclusion: Socialism was constructed in the United States, not the USSR. And people are already saying this in seminars...

But from the articles in your magazine and in general it is known, for example, that all there is to Reaganomics is a life in debt; it is not for me to explain to you how the United States came up with 3 trillion dollars in internal debts and more than 200 billion in foreign debts to match your articles about the people who are homeless, unemployed, and alone or about the receipt of profit outside the sphere of human activity (about which even Lenin warned, as he did about the ruthless operation of capitalism), about the fact that a small minority has absolutely all the country's wealth, about the fact that, for example, under Reagan the number of billionaires and millionaires increased ten-fold, and so forth and so on (raise an objection!).

On the other hand, in the USSR there are: feudal conditions before the revolution, ruin, war, Stalinism, commitment to military expenditures which, with the USSR having half the budget and with the achievement of military-strategic parity in the literal sense, stripped the country (even the United States could not keep up this race). Yet the threat of war, and a nuclear war at that, even today has only been postponed and not eliminated...

I do not think Comrade Zaychenko's data should be drowned in all of the issues I have listed above, but what is clear is that from an ideological standpoint his article is passive and does not give a socialist perspective.

I have been reading your magazine for decades and, to be honest, this is the first time I have encountered such an interpretation of the facts in your magazine. If you think this is the way glasnost should be understood, allow me to say that the majority of Soviet people, especially those who believe in socialism and value highly the labor and misfortunes of past years, in spite of Stalinism, are of a different opinion.

A.S. Freydenberg, Sverdlovsk

I am against the author's methods of approaching the data because the simple person does not understand them and they might evoke the wrong kind of agitation. We do not need this!

A.S. Zaychenko's calculations are very, very conventional not to say questionable. Not everyone will understand what they are based on, but still the figures are striking. We all know, of course, that the USSR lags behind the United States in terms of its level of technical progress and a number of other components. Therefore it is better to give the cost of a kilogram of meat, butter, bread, and so forth here and in the United States. Everyone, every housewife, could understand this.¹

I disagree with another one of the author's conclusions as well. He writes: "...in the USSR the current level of retail prices for consumer goods and services (especially food) is one of the highest in the world." This is an unfounded generalization, and we need the real information about various kinds of goods.

I do not see why we should not do a calculation and make a comparison between private consumption in the USSR and the United States! In the first place, our people are already disturbed about our many difficulties and shortcomings, especially having to do with food products and consumer goods. Do we need to throw oil on the fire, the more so with such questionable comparisons! Are there really no other figures concerning services for the people (such as, say, the cost of medical service, rent, childcare, transportation, and so forth). Second, the magazine SSHA—EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA is read abroad, including in the United States. What will be the reaction to these comparisons there, especially from our enemies!

F.U. Sokolov, member of the CPSU since 1939, disabled veteran of the second group, Kuybyshev

In Comrade A.S. Zaychenko's article (No 12, 1988) he asserts that for a long time (120 years) the proportion of the general wage fund in the national income of the United States has not changed and comprises 60-80 percent. This figure seems incorrect to me since it contradicts all other research on the United States where, it is asserted, the degree of exploitation is increasing and the workers' share of the national income is decreasing. I ask the author to share his method of calculation and particularly to explain what he includes in the overall sum of wages: wages of workers in the production and nonproduction sphere, or perhaps also the incomes of capitalists are called "wages"? Then a question arises: Does the author subscribe to the Marxian theory of added value, or does he perhaps think that there have been no capitalism or exploitation in the United States for a long time? At the same time I should like to have an explanation for this: According to the author's calculations, on what are the remaining 40-20 percent of the national income spent?

One is also inclined to disagree with the figures and statements the author adduces to show that the standard of living in our country in terms of a number of important indicators is lower now than the prerevolutionary level in tsarist Russia. It would seem that this is a case of tinkering with the figures.

Of course the "residual principle" in solving social problems and the harm that was caused by Stalinism and the administrative-command methods of the period of stagnation led to a situation where improvement of the standard of living in our country did not take place not as it should have under socialism. But still it is hardly correct to state that the standard of living did not rise at all during the years of Soviet power. (For the author writes that the proportion of the wage fund in the national income was higher before the revolution than it is now.)

I ask the author to explain these questions.

V.Ye. Latyshev, political economics instructor of the Yaroslav branch of the All-Union Correspondence Finance-Economics Institute

I read the article with great interest. It is a pity that this work did not give the statistics for 1940-1952, which would apparently show the dynamics of consumption in our country after collectivization and also after the devastating war—also in comparison with the United States. The mass reader will be grateful for your future works.

G.M. Klimenko Kiev

A.S. Zaychenko's article, "United States-USSR: Private Consumption," was extremely interesting but with much of the data, unfortunately, it gave incorrect comparisons with the United States and with the prerevolutionary period. I agree with the comments from the USSR State Committee for Statistics (see MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 30 December 1988). I urge you to publish my own comments on this article in which I give different comparisons and ones using data whose sources are not questionable.

The author writes that the smaller the proportion of expenditures on food, the higher the standard of living. In the United States more than half of the family expenditures go for rent, municipal services, and transportation. The monthly rent for a two-room apartment with utilities is more than 1,000 dollars or more than in the USSR by a factor of 50-60. A Moscow family of three spends 110 rubles a year on public transportation (5 kopecks a ride) while in New York a ride on the subway, trolley, or bus costs 1-2 dollars, i.e. 20-40 times more. And, of course, it is very costly to keep a private car, with insurance, parking, repair, and service.

According to data of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, the average per capita monetary income in families of workers and employees in 1988 was 152 rubles a month, and the proportion of expenditures on food was 34 percent but when one includes taxes, bills, and accumulations it is 40 percent. But the author arbitrarily took a family with an average per capita income of 95 rubles a month with a proportion of expenditures on food of 59 percent, and makes the comparison on the basis of these data. According to official data, two-thirds of our country's population

(including rural) have incomes of more than 100 rubles a month per person, including 37 percent of the population with an income of more than 150 rubles per month per person.

The data the author uses concerning the proportion of expenditures on alcoholic beverages in the overall expenditures are also incomprehensible: in the USSR—13 percent and in the United States—2 percent. Here are the official figures from the statistical collection "The USSR National Economy": 2-3 percent in the families of workers, employees, and kolkhoz workers, and in the United States, according to data of the statistical collection of the International Organization of Labor, they are 6.2 percent.

Therefore it is not altogether correct to compare only expenditures on food without taking other primary expenditures into account or to compare wages and the cost of a unit of food products. It is necessary to determine first of all how much the families have left after paying taxes, bills for rent and municipal services, and transportation and other expenditures. It is possible to give other comparative data concerning the cost of medical care and education and determine how much they must work to pay for these services, for rent, and so forth.

The author of the article writes that in the United States "both average-income and low-income Americans consume their 100-120 kilograms of meat." But here are the figures from the statistical collection of the International Organization of Labor from materials from an investigation of family budgets in the United States: Low-income families of Americans spend one-eighth as much on meat and fish products as the higher-income families do, they spend one-seventh to one-eighth as much on dairy products, eggs, and fruits, and so forth and so on, i.e. the structure of nutrition varies sharply with various levels of income.

The author is wrong when he says that in the USSR the current level of retail prices for food products is one of the highest in the world. Of course, both labor productivity and wages in the United States are several times higher than here, but so are the prices for food products, especially meat and dairy products, several times higher. You cannot eat even in a cheap cafe for 3-4 dollars. This pertains to other capitalist countries as well, and I know this for certain because I have worked for many years in international organizations. The assertion of the author of the article that "in 1913 the per capita meat consumption in cities of the Russian empire was 88 kilograms, in Moscow—87, in Petersburg—94, in Vladimir and Vologda—107, and in Voronezh—148 kilograms" is incorrect.

The author of the article does not recognize the results of the research on family budgets conducted before the revolution by the land statisticians A.M. Stopani, A.I. Shingarev, I.M. Shaposhnikov, and others which were published in the following books: Stopani, A.M., "The

Petroleum Industry Worker and His Budget"; Shingarev, A.I., "The Dying Village. Experiment in Sanitary-Economic Research in Two Villages of Voronezh Uyezd"; Shaposhnikov, I.M., "The Budget of a Workers of One of the Factories of Bogorod Uyezd in Relation to Food and Disease"; and also official publications of the USSR State Committee for Statistics to the effect that the per capita consumption of meat and meat products in 1913 throughout the country as a whole was 29 kilograms. Instead of these official data, the author gives his own calculations of the average per capita meat consumption in a number of oblasts of Russia which are supposed to be based on materials from the veterinary administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Unfortunately, certain newspapers have reprinted this article with unverified data and the corresponding conclusions, and the readers are far from always have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the archive documents, nor do they have time for this.

D.I. Dumnov, candidate of economic sciences, disabled veteran of the Great Patriotic War Moscow

A.S. Zaychenko's article in issue 12 of your magazine for last year concerning private consumption in the United States and the USSR evoked not only interest but also a number of questions and, if I may, objections. We find analogous material on the United States in the encyclopedic reference "The Modern United States of American" which just went on sale. A.S. Zaychenko participates in this significant publication. But one is struck by the fact that the tone of the article is somewhat different from that of the aforementioned material.

First. A.S. Zaychenko focuses his research on the problem of private consumption. A comparison between the USSR and the United States in this area shows us at a great disadvantage. All this is true. But does the analysis presented in the article not seem to the author to be one-sided?

The newspaper VECHERNIY KIEV reprinted an abridged version of A.S. Zaychenko's article and thus again reminded us how unenviable our economic situation is. But the problem is that from this piece (and also, incidentally, from the article in the magazine) one cannot understand how the Americans manage to get hold of so much manna from heaven! This sad irony is caused by the fact that the article, in our view, does not have enough of an important constituent: the indication of the source of the Americans' high level of private consumption. This probably arises from the fact that workers, engineers, and managers work as they should, are highly organized, intelligent, and so forth (and not only because they have a high level of real income). In other words, they receive what they have earned and produced and therefore they have the possibility of consuming a large amount of high-quality products. There is no need to remind the reader of this again. This is where the line of comparisons should run, in my opinion, if they are so necessary.

Moreover, without taking into account the interconnection between consumption and production it is impossible to prove why Americans have a high level of access to goods and services and we do not have this. Incidentally, is there any reason to complain about the small proportion of wages in the USSR national income while there is an immense amount of unbacked paper money in circulation? Investigation of these problems along with those presented in the article would probably strengthen its effect on people's minds.

Second. The comparison of the public consumption funds in the two countries. From the article the uninitiated reader draws the conclusion that the American state and private business are very philanthropic: After all, they allot many billions of dollars for social programs since they are concerned about simple mortals. But is it philanthropy or redistribution activity on the part of the state? If it is redistribution, what are the sources for it? Does the worker himself participate in the formation of future pensions and other social payments or does the state support him in his old age and when he is seriously ill? It would seem that a comparison of Soviet and American pensions and other payments without analyzing all of the above is not so much an analysis as sensationalism. This happens because the reader does not obtain information for reflection from the article. Such information is contained in the Encyclopedic Reference on the United States, but far from everyone can read it.

The same thing can be said about the data concerning the unprecedentedly high meat consumption in Vologda or Voronezh in prerevolutionary times. Is it really true that the per capita meat consumption in these cities was 100-150 kilograms as compared to the average for Russia as a whole in 1913 of 29 kilograms! Were these some kind of special cities in which there were no workers, poor, aged, servants, or unemployed? Or did all of them have the same ration as the merchants, nobility, landowners, state bureaucrats, and so forth? For only one figure was given without any breakdown of its content. Do these average amounts help to get a picture of real prerevolutionary life? It would seem that again we are making a mistake by forming in people's minds a one-sided picture of days gone by.

It seems that the author could be reproached for a certain one-sidedness of his analysis of private consumption in the United States and excessive manipulation of average statistical amounts. One is also concerned about the fact that unsubstantiated criticism, as a rule, has the opposite effect from what was intended.

Z.M. Sagalovich, candidate of economic sciences Kiev

In No 12 for 1988 your magazine published an article by Comrade A.S. Zaychenko, "United States-USSR: Private Consumption (Some Comparisons)." The correctness of this article in the form in which it was presented is questionable.

The question arises: Can one compare the standards of living of states that are so different in their historical development and conditions for existence, not to mention the differences in the climate, the composition and distribution of the population, national peculiarities, and customs? Can one say with a clear conscience that the USSR is lagging behind in all areas related to the standard of living of the population when the United States has not experienced a single war on its territory during this century but has gained from the wars in other countries, including the USSR?

There are no reservations regarding such things in the article. Moreover, it gives materials from American economists for comparing the standards of living of the population in the United States and the USSR with an incredible adjustment of the actual amounts of consumption in the USSR with which one cannot agree. And the author of the article recognizes the inadequacy of this adjustment because of the "poor quality of the goods that are consumed and incomparably narrower assortment of goods and services in the Soviet Union"!

Further. Is the United States the standard for consumption? I do not think so. Our science has developed norms for rational consumption which reflect the needs of the people of a socialist society. They can be criticized and corrected. But they differ and should differ from the level of consumption established in the United States. In our country we do not set the task of increasing meat consumption to 120 kilograms per capita (science is against this) and it would hardly be expedient to increase the amount of good housing by a factor of 6-7 (2-3 rooms per person), to increase the fleet of private automobiles to the U.S. level, and build a spirit of competition on this.

One cannot agree with the notion that in the USSR prices of food products are among the highest. The estimate that bread is less economically accessible here than it is in the United States is questionable when in the United States, according to an article by this same author, 1 kilogram of bread costs 2 dollars.

The calculations of labor expenditures of one worker in the USSR to pay for 1 square meter of dwelling space do not inspire confidence. On the basis of the initial data used by the Author, in the USSR the expenditures should be considerably less and not more than in the United States.

Glasnost is necessary but it must not be used for agitation by means of nonobjective, distorted information or to disorient public opinion.

S.P. Obraztsova Moscow

A. Zaychenko's article, "United States-USSR: Private Consumption (Some Comparisons!)" in No 12, 1988 shook me although I had been aware of much of the information in the article even before it was published. But here we have a significant quantity of socioeconomic material about the two countries, the United States and

the USSR, gathered and discussed and commented upon intelligently, and it has convincingly shown not only our unenviable situation but also the predictability of this situation because of the economic system in effect in our country. And the only consolation for us is the success of the NEP during the twenties under Lenin and during the first years after his death until Stalin rejected the NEP and buried this Leninist policy.

It is my firm conviction that all members of the CPSU should read this article—from the members of the Politburo to the rank-and-file communists, workers, and peasants.

B.I. Tyagunov, participant in the Great Patriotic and Finnish wars, labor veteran, former laboratory chief of the Energy Institute imeni G.M. Krzhizhovskiy Moscow

A.S. Zaychenko: What the USSR State Committee for Statistics is Not Revealing

The readers' responses to my article show their deep interest in the problems that were touched upon. I shall try to respond to the main one: For to explain each figure and each comparison, to introduce calculation methods for each occasion would obviously take a whole book. I shall concentrate on the principal problem: How are our official statistics actually compiled. An excellent illustration is provided by the data provided by the State Committee for Statistics concerning meat consumption in the USSR and the United States.

In the variant of my article prepared by the NOVOSTI press agency for the local newspapers it is noted that in terms of per capita meat consumption we are lagging behind the United States by a factor of 3; the USSR State Committee for Statistics, based on its own figures, asserts that it is a factor of 2. But one can only compare what is being compared.

In the first place, if one subtracts from meat production, as the Americans do, such ingredients as fat and byproducts of the first and second categories, in the USSR there remains 52.7 kilograms of meat per capita and in the United States—112 (data for 1985). Further, the State Committee for Statistics, allowing themselves a "small trick," proceeds to include the suet and fat in the calorie equivalent, multiplying its weight by 1.4. But has this really made the suet into meat just because it has increased in weight which, by the way, is completely unjustified? The State Committee for Statistics itself recognizes that losses in meat production amount to 1 million tons or more than 3 kilograms per person. But our official statistics consider that these kilograms have also been eaten.

Moreover, because of the poor quality of the meat products and their poor storage in the distribution network, and also because of the chronic shortage of them which forces the consumers who need them to buy them up for future use, losses of meat products amount to more than 3 additional kilograms per person per year.

As a result the total losses approach 7 kilograms, leaving 45.7 kilograms for consumption.

This, however, is not all. The internal fat (lard) and other products (brains, membranes in the head) that are not even included in byproducts again are counted as part of meat consumption in our country while they are not in the United States. If we subtract this amount in our comparison with the United States it amounts to another 3 kilograms. We have not yet worked out a method of comparing poultry meat. In the United States they count only the fully cleaned bird while in the majority of cases in the USSR we count the head, the neck, the feet, and the giblets. Further, for poultry meat American statistics include only chickens and turkeys while we include all kinds of birds. The same thing applies to other categories of meat: In the United States they count only the meat of cows, sheep, and hogs while in the Soviet Union we include practically all domestic animals, including goats, horses, reindeer, camels, rabbits, and so forth. When the indicators are standardized the per capita meat consumption in the USSR will drop at least to 40 kilograms or in the United States it will increase to 120 kilograms.

But even this is not all. The reports frequently include meat of animals killed according to the schedule of "compulsory slaughter" and even those that have died from other causes, which should in no case make its way to the consumer. Cases of this kind of padding of figures are known but it is difficult to make a quantitative assessment of them. And one should also keep in mind that, according to the data of the State Committee for Statistics, more than one-fourth of all the meat is produced on private subsidiary farms where it is extremely difficult to keep precise accounts. There is significant repeated accounting for meat resources when young cattle and hogs are purchased from the population. And again the per capita consumption is considerably inflated here. By how much? It would be very difficult to find out precisely.

One can also give other peculiarities of meat consumption in the two countries that are not taken into account. Thus because of the better technology for keeping and feeding the animals the qualitative structure of meat in the United States is significantly better than in the USSR. For example American pork is leaner. And again this leads to artificially increasing the data for meat consumption in the USSR since in our country fat is "added" to red meat through the aforementioned multiplication of its weight by 1.4. But even without taking into account the circumstances mentioned above the per capita meat consumption in the United States is still at least three times as great. Approximately the same results were reached by specialists of other scientific institutes (All-Union Institute for Study of Demand of the Population and Market Conditions, Institute of Economics and Prognostication of Scientific and Technical Progress, and others).

The second objection given in the response from the State Committee for Statistics and the readers' letters

pertains to per capita meat consumption in the USSR in 1927 and in old Russia in 1913.

In 1913 an average city resident had 70 kilograms, and of one is to use the modern Soviet methodology for calculation, 88 kilograms of meat, and in 1927—78 kilograms. The State Committee for Statistics disputes these figures and estimates the level of consumption in 1913 at 29 kilograms and in 1927—40 (for cities) and 24 kilograms (for rural areas). Where does this difference come from? If the authors of the response had not limited themselves to the version of the NOVOSTI news agency and had used the article itself which was published in SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, they would have found the reason for this.

First of all, before the revolution and in the twenties poultry meat was not taken into account in meat consumption. For red meat the information for 1913 is based on data from reports that were submitted regularly by the veterinary inspection of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.¹ It counted only slaughtered meat that had undergone veterinary inspection in cities with a population of more than 50,000. The estimates were made per capita and not per adult eater (as the State Committee for Statistics for some reason); moreover this included only commercial meat consumed throughout the year. Meat sold in small cities, villages, and local markets, that which was sold without veterinary inspection or produced and consumed within the household was not reflected in this report. And these are the sources that accounted for the majority of meat consumption in villages and small cities.

Similar figures were obtained during the course of selective investigations of workers' families. Thus in 1910, according to data from an investigation of families of Russian workers in Baku (conducted by A.M. Stopani), for each mouth to feed there were 15.62 pounds per month or 57 kilograms of meat per capita per year,² and according to the modern methods of the State Committee for Statistics—about 70 kilograms. Workers of Lenskiy mines consumed more than 150 kilograms of meat per year in 1912.³

Finally, these data are confirmed also by the results of food censuses of the cities of Russia that were conducted during the years of World War I. And although the production and consumption of meat dropped during these years, by modern standards they were at a high level. In 1915-1916 its consumption per capita of urban population was: Moscow—76.3 kilograms, Orenburg—149.6, Saratov—64.3, Kazan—68.8, Ryazan—112.2, Penza—69, and Simbirsk—70.3 kilograms per year.⁴

Approximately the same level of consumption was reached in 1927, which is shown by numerous data of the USSR Central Statistical Administration for this period and also the calculations of Ye. Kabo, Academician S.G. Strumilin, and other scholars. According to data of the

statistical annual of the USSR Central Statistical Administration, in November 1927 per capita of urban population of the USSR in workers' families the consumption was 60.3 kilograms, and in employees' families—63.2 kilograms; in the Ukraine (figures for industrial workers)—82 kilograms; investigations for rural areas give a smaller figure—45-47 kilograms.³

The high level of meat consumption in 1913 and 1927 is confirmed also by the data for the herd of domestic animals. For every 100 residents of the country there were the following numbers of cattle: 1913—31.6, 1927—44.5, 1988—42.3; sheep and goats—52, 91, and 51, respectively. Only for the number of head of hogs has there been a significant increase. But previously, as was already noted, they did not include the meat of poultry, reindeer, or other domestic animals, and in 1913 and 1927 they would have provided a great advantage. For example, during these years for every 100 people there were 10 times as many horses as there are today, and more than one-fourth of them were meat breeds.

It should be kept in mind, however, that meat consumption cannot serve as an adequate indicator of the standard of living as a whole. Clothing and industrial items were relatively costly and not readily available to the majority of families in Russia, and housing for workers, as a rule, amounted to a room in a barracks. The high level of meat consumption by the male workers in the Lenskiy mines was explained by the relatively small number of them among the primarily rural population of the surrounding regions and also the exceptionally hard working conditions. During the twenties the overall availability of meat and bread occurred at the same time as a less than normal consumption of dairy products, sugar, vegetables, and fruits; clothing and industrial items were very costly for workers' families. Of course the discussions of the hopeless poverty and the dying out of the villages in prerevolutionary Russia are an example of social hyperbole, for the rates of natural growth of the rural peasantry during this period were among the highest in history.⁶ At the same time the patriarchal structure and the weak involvement in economic and cultural integration processes placed on the standard of living of the majority of the country's population the stamp not only of poverty but also of chronic underconsumption of many goods.

Even in the twenties when the economic position of the majority of peasant farms was fairly stable, the provision of the rural population with necessities was very low. The situation was a little better in workers' families where in 1927 for every 100 men there were 28 men's summer suits and 31 winter suits as well as 117 pair of woolen trousers; for every 100 women there were 34 women's suites, 74 woolen dresses, and 88 woolen skirts. So the relatively high volume of consumption of traditional food products was accompanied by very low standards for other components of the standard of living.⁷

Now about American and, in general, foreign data concerning the standard of living in the USSR. For a long time we considered these to be merely "anti-Soviet fabrications," "intrigues of the enemies of socialism," which were carefully concealed from the general public. But as the real state of affairs began to come clear we could see not only the scope and depth of our backwardness in this area but also the lack of methodological preparation of Soviet official statistics for correct international comparisons. It was not only that the data themselves were concealed and the Soviet citizens were not allowed to know the truth; for even in restricted works intended for a select group of people there were no correct comparisons either. During the years of stagnation the highest echelon of power did not want to know the truth!

A number of leaders of the USSR State Committee for Statistics are already on pension (such as my opponent Comrade D.I. Dumnov) while others remain at the helm of Soviet statistics. Unfortunately, not all of them have the courage to reject the traditional approaches of the past and seen in any criticism or clarification an encroachment on their personal authority. It is a strange thing that when criticizing the authors of calculations that are different from the variant of the State Committee for Statistics (Khanin, Selyunin, Simonyan, Zaychenko), representatives of this department very rarely argue their position with methodological computations. What can be said if even the statistical annuals are supplied with extremely lapidary methodological clarifications but for entire sections of these collections (labor, the standard of living, and others) the cases of lack of clarity are much greater than the specificity required in this sphere of knowledge. I shall not go into the means and devices used by official statistics to deliberately reduce the cognitive value of information (including manipulation of prices, breaks in dynamic series, juggling of relative figures, and so forth). And yet as a result it turns out to be impossible to recheck these data! It is no accident that the methodological devices for processing information in the USSR State Committee for Statistics remain beyond the understanding of economists. Under these conditions there is no point in any dispute about figures or their adequacy.

For the majority of indicators of the standard of living (production and consumption of goods and services, family budgets, consumer expenditures of the population, and many other things) economists cannot obtain clearcut explanations: What does this figure mean? Not to mention how it was arrived at. Therefore specialists, especially those familiar with international statistics, can make an approximate judgment of their quality just from the quantitative values of the indicators. In any case the majority of data published for the USSR are incompatible with the corresponding foreign indicators. Therefore it is wrong to do international comparisons (for example, with the United States) on the basis of current official statistics, as is frequently done recently in publications of the State Committee for Statistics.

In a recent interview with one of the leaders of the State Committee for Statistics (IZVESTIYA 16 January 1989) in response to a request to comment on data presented in the press to the effect that the standard of living in the USSR is lower than in the United States by a factor of 3, he answered that one could assert with equal success "that our standard of living was, say, higher by a factor of 1.5." I do not know what this official of the State Committee for Statistics had in mind when he undertook to prove the unprovable, but I assume that he was arguing with my article, in which precisely these comparisons were given ("lower by a factor of 3..."). But, I repeat, these American comparisons are jacked up—in favor of the USSR, which was discussed in my article.

The fact is that according to the generally accepted methods of international comparisons the final results of calculations (in this case for the USSR and the United States) are paired comparisons of the per capita consumption of quantitative volumes of goods and services in rubles (in the structure of private consumption of the United States) and dollars (in the structure of consumption in the USSR); then through a geometrical average these evaluations are reduced to a single one. This methodological approach is quite appropriate when comparing the levels of consumption in countries with similar principles for the functioning of the economy, distribution processes, price setting, and similar parameters of the quality of the consumed goods and services. For example it is quite appropriate to have comparisons like "United States-France," "England-Kenya," or "Italy-South Korea." But analogous comparisons between the USSR and the United States using this method would be incorrect.

In the first place, for a very large list of goods and services available to the American there are no analogs in the Soviet Union. How, for example, does one evaluate the lack of a dishwasher or other kitchen equipment in the consumption of the Soviet family (even in those where both the husband and wife work), a diverse assortment of clothing and furniture, domestic, leisure, and recreational services or, say, medical care for patients after leaving the hospital? Such goods can hardly be just left out of the comparisons. Under the conditions of the undeveloped unity of production, daily life, and recreation the lack of many kinds of consumer goods cannot be compensated for with anything and is a direct deduction (gap) from the private consumption fund. Moreover, the lack of certain goods and services leads to an underutilization of many other kinds of goods. Thus the lack of private automobiles leads to an underconsumption ("for the same money") under the item "recreation"; in turn, a shortage of the necessary sports goods reduces the volume and quality of that same recreation, but if without them there is no point in going out in nature, why does one need an automobile? The consumer qualities of many goods and services decrease also because of the shortage of free time, which is caused by excessive expenditures of time on transportation, on the "shopping," on waiting in line, on preparing food,

and so forth. By economizing, say, on funds under the item "paid services" our person underutilizes the consumer qualities of almost all the goods and services he buys. This is why, again, it is possible to measure and compare the volumes of per capita consumption apart from the quality of life only for countries with similar conditions for the distribution of material goods.

The second circumstance of no small importance which distorts the picture of the comparisons is the underestimation of qualitative differences between the goods and services that are being compared. Foreign specialists frequently have no idea of these differences. For example, it is hardly possible to compare the meat sold in the retail networks of the USSR and the United States: To a considerable degree ours consists of elements which would hardly be called meat in the full sense of the word. Many kinds of medical and municipal-domestic services rendered to the Soviet consumer are of such poor quality that they hardly have any "value" or "price." Sometimes they can even have a negative consumer value, that is, they only cause harm to the income, property, and health of the citizens. Indirect evidence of the regular underconsumption of real goods (medicines) and services (medical) and the impossibility of finding a replacement or compensation for them is provided by data on the deterioration of health (including more disease and death) in all age groups, in all republics, in the city and the country, for men and women, and for the basic groups of diseases during the period of 1960-1980. This is a unique phenomenon for the modern socio-demographic situation in the world!

Incorrect reporting of prices for consumer goods and services leads to a significant "cost reduction" of our consumption and, consequently, to an artificial increase in the data concerning the standard of living. For example for a long time only state prices were taken into account (and in recent times prices of state and cooperative trade). But market prices were not taken into account at all. Yet cooperative and market prices for food products are more than twice as high as state prices. But the kolkhoz market and cooperation account for up to half of the overall number of procurements of such important food items as meat, potatoes, fruits, and vegetables.

Figures on the structure of the family budget also evoked objections from my opponents. As concerns indicators for the United States, here there are no discrepancies with the State Committee for Statistics. But there are serious doubts about the official figures for the structure of the budgets of Soviet families.

The fact is that in the statistics for the standard of living of developed countries of the world there are two basic structural indicators: the structure of expenditures on private consumption and the composition of the family budget. The first indicators reflects how much money was spent on private consumption of goods and services from all sources (the population, the state, business); it is calculated on the macro level using the method of

national accounts. And the family budgets show how much of the overall sum of spent family income went for the purchase of individual kinds of consumer services. Unfortunately, neither one of these indicators are to be found in our statistics. The structure of the incomes and expenditures of families of workers and employees given by the State Committee for Statistics contains an internal contradiction since the family incomes include revenues from public consumption funds (including those that are not used for private consumption) and the expenditures of these families are unjustifiably increased—for such items as food, alcohol, housing, and certain other things. And from the proportion of expenditures on food they judge the standards of consumption in the country: the lower this proportion, the higher the standard of living. As a result, Soviet data concerning the structure of family budgets are simply incompatible with international statistics.

A number of remarks pertain to the proportion of wages in the national income. It is not surprising that up to this point we have remained silent about this exceptionally important proportion which essentially serves as the most reliable measure for determining the degree of exploitation of live labor. Whatever reliable statistical method we may use to calculate this proportion (taking into account social benefits or not, including the wages of high managers or not), in any case it turns out that wages in the USSR comprise a much smaller share of the national income than they do in the United States and other developed countries of the world (and also compared to Russia in 1913 and the USSR in the twenties).

Statements to the effect that it is good that we have this small proportion since we are not "earning" even this show the lack of understanding of the significance of this proportion. At the same time they are the result of a myth which has been cultivated in our minds for many years: "We are working poorly and therefore we are receiving little." This myth has instilled in us a feeling of our own social harmfulness, our eternal indebtedness to the state. In reality everything is the opposite. We clearly do not receive enough of the new wealth we create with our labor as compared to other nations, then and now. The small proportion of the wage fund and private consumption in the Soviet Union show that if we work at a value 3 (on a 5-point scale) we receive compensation at a value of 2. In other words, our country ranks much higher in the world in terms of the productivity of public labor than it does in terms of private consumption.

The feeling of ideological discomfort that some people have can cause a loss of faith in another myth: concerning the exceptionally high position the USSR occupies in the world with respect to the proportion of the national income spent on public consumption funds. And yet the Soviet Union falls behind all developed countries in this respect.

Now about the prices and the economic availability of goods. In John Reed's book "Ten Days That Shook the World" (Moscow, 1958, pp 253, 254) there are excerpts

from the newspaper NOVAYA ZHIZN for 13 October 1917 concerning prices for certain consumer goods and the daily earnings of certain categories of workers in Moscow during July-August 1914. These figures are confirmed by a committee of representatives of the Moscow Chamber of Commerce and the Moscow division of the labor ministry. From them one can see that masons and plasterers could earn about 4 kilograms of beef a day; in order to purchase a pair of men's shoes they would have to work about 6 days, and a woolen men's suit—20 days. The lowest paid manual laborer would have to work an average of 60 percent longer to purchase these goods. As we can see, the economic availability of meat and other goods for workers in 1913 was greater than it is at present. Corresponding figures can be obtained from statistical data for Russia as well.⁸ The economic availability of the basic consumer goods was at approximately the same level during the second half of the twenties.⁹

Special attention should be given to the letter from Comrade D.I. Dumnov—both because of the questions raised in it and because of the fact that it was written by a former official of the USSR State Committee for Statistics.

Let us begin with housing. The monthly rent for a two-room apartment (more than 1,000 dollars) reflects the rising cost of living in New York (where Comrade Dumnov worked for a long time) because in 1983 the average family spent 315 dollars on rent. Taking into account the fact that two-thirds of American families live in their own homes, the average expenditures on housing in 1983 amounted to 424.3 dollars a month. One can find all this out by looking at the "Statistical Annals" published in the United States. A number of articles in the magazine have already given the family expenditures on the other components of consumption.¹⁰ It is a pity that my opponent paid no attention to them. Since the provision of useful space per person in the USSR is one-fourth of what it is in the United States, in order to pay for 1 square meter a month the average worker must give: In the USSR, taking state subsidies into account, 1.23 hours of working time and in the United States (just out of his own pocket)—0.87 hours. In other words our preferential state housing costs 41 percent more and cooperative housing—3.5 times more.

Now about the average per capita income and the budget of the Soviet family. The State Committee for Statistics gives no figures either on the expenditures of our families or on the structures of their family budgets. The figures on family budgets published by this department, as was stated above, have nothing in common with the real expenditures of the families and therefore cannot be compared with the international statistics for family budgets (including in the United States). So the assertion of the State Committee for Statistics (and of Comrade Dumanov as well) that our families spend 34 percent on food (the collection "The USSR National Economy Over 70 Years" says 28.3 percent), 2.4 percent on alcohol, and 2.6 percent on housing clearly does not reveal the essence

of the matter: The consumption of alcohol does not include home brew or homemade wine (and almost as much of them is drunk as is sold through the retail network) and expenditures on housing and food are artificially lowered.

In order to compare the structure of expenditures of families for the USSR and the United States, a "method of models" was adopted, i.e. the two families (American and Soviet) were conventionally equated in some way. As "models" they used an urban family of four: a working couple receiving the average wages for the country and two minor children; taxes were subtracted from the income. Nonmonetary payments from public consumption funds were not taken into account since they are expenditures of the state rather than of the families (Therefore this item is not reflected in international statistics). But even if one adds these expenditures, we gain nothing from this addition since in the USSR the proportion of public consumption funds in the gross national product was about 20 percent in 1985 while in the United States it was about 29 percent.

As concerns expenditures on food in the two countries, they are calculated by multiplying the official data for the volume of per capita consumption of the basic food products by the corresponding prices. As a result, the share of expenditures of urban families on food in the budget of the Soviet family was 60 percent and in the United States—16 percent. Incidentally, our calculations of this proportion for the United States almost coincided with the official American figures from budget research (16.6 percent), which shows again the correctness of this method.

In order to prove that the cost of living is higher in America than in the USSR Comrade Dumnov gives comparable data concerning the cost of medical and transportation services. I do not want to repeat myself but I must. Here again we are dealing with an old propagandistic myth. Yes, medical service in the United States is costly, but the lion's share of these expenditures are born by the state and business. Because of this, the average American family spends 4.5 percent of its budget on first-class medical services, and this is as much as was spent at the beginning of the twentieth century. Yes, public transportation is costly, but it is not the "main thing" in passenger transportation. Today one household has 1.8 automobiles.

Now about the inequality in meat consumption in the United States. When questioning my figures Comrade Dumnov relies on data of the International Organization of Labor, which compare amorphous, quantitatively indistinct categories—"low Income," "higher income." Of course even in the richest country (the United States, Sweden, and others) one can find a low income group of unfortunates who consume very little meat or eat none of it at all. But this comparison does not do much good. One must compare the consumer capabilities of significant groups of the population with clearly expressed differences in socioeconomic status.

I relied both on official American statistics and on the work of American scholars in this area. According to economic laws, the volume of goods consumed by the family is determined by the so-called elasticity of the consumption of the given commodity, which shows how expenditures on the purchase of the commodity increases when the income increases by a certain amount. As a rule, the increase of the purchased volumes of the commodity begins to decline as the income increases and there is a saturation with the commodity—and the family begins to purchase not more of it but of a better quality. This is especially typical of food for which there are strict physiological limits of consumption. When the market is saturated with meat products and there is a wide selection of kinds and grades of meat with respect to both prices and quality, families with the most varied incomes can acquire products, including meat, depending on its own possibilities. America reached this kind of saturation of the market with food as early as the thirties. As an example we can give the expenditures of the poorest 10 percent and the most well-to-do 10 percent of the households in 1973 (the latest available figures). The group of poor families spent per person per year 44 dollars on pork, 48—on beef, 15—on other meat products, and 23—on poultry, and for the group of rich families the corresponding figures were: 35, 82, 19, and 22. On the whole the per capita consumption of food products in the most well-to-do families was only 10 percent greater than in the poor families. At the same time, for clothing, automobiles, recreation, and certain other items there was a 2.5-5-fold difference.¹¹

Finally, about meat consumption in Russia. As was already stated above, our figures for the cities (70 kilograms per person per year) were taken from official Russian statistics which were indirectly confirmed by the results of budget investigations and food censuses of the cities. For comparison with modern figures published by the State Committee for Statistics, indicators of meat consumption for 1913 and 1928 must be recalculated using the methods presented at the beginning of this response. This is how we came up with such figures as 88 kilograms (for Russia), 87 kilograms (Moscow), and so forth.

Comrade Dumnov mentions the book by A.I. Shingarev, "The Dying Village..." which is devoted to the position of the peasant while I was considering exclusively the position of city dwellers. Moreover, Shingarev himself admits that he used data from investigations of the poorest villages of Voronezh province in which meat consumption was much less than the average for peasant families in Russia.

Finally, the source of the data of the USSR State Committee for Statistics concerning the per capita meat consumption in 1913 at the level of 29 kilograms and in 1927—27 kilograms.¹² In the collection "Agriculture of the USSR" (Moscow, 1988) on page 10 is an indicator of meat production in 1913—5 million tons. Having divided this figure by the population of Russia at the

time (not including Finland and the nine Vistula provinces), we obtain 30 kilograms. This took into account only the meat of cows, sheep, goats, and hogs. For some reason the State Committee for Statistics "forgot" about the production in Russia of meat of poultry, rabbits, reindeer, and horses, and in Central Asia—the meat of donkeys and camels). And it "forgot" probably because for many kinds of this meat in 1913 and 1926-1928 the situation was much better than it is today. But even if one takes only what is compared by the State Committee for Statistics, i.e. the meat of cows, hogs, goats, and sheep, can one believe that in 1987 we produced 15.6 million tons and in 1913—only 5 million and 1928—4.5 million tons, when at that time there was approximately the same quantity of livestock per 100 people? The larger number of hogs cannot explain this difference.

Why is the publication of alternative data encountering such harsh resistance? The position of the State Committee for Statistics is clear; it is defending the honor of the uniform. Having given the "higher ups" information they knew to be wrong, the State Committee for Statistics, naturally, has assumed the pose of defending it faithfully. Data that contradict our ideas about the false achievements of collectivized agriculture declared to be truly socialist are inconvenient and uncouth to many people. And yet our real standard of living in the near future will depend on the figures we use when developing programs for the advancement of agriculture. For if all is well there is no need for radical reforms and we can just put on a little pressure and carry out another administrative reform and thus achieve the desired result. This solution suits many who remain faithful to the command-bureaucratic system.

Of course I by no means consider the figures I used in my article to be final or beyond doubt. For with the long pause in the discussion of concrete problems of private consumption that has occurred since the end of the twenties, alas, no data can claim to be highly precise. Only a constructive discussion of the figures and the methods of calculating them, in which economists and sociologists participate along with the State Committee for Statistics, will help to fill this large and very important gap in the economic history of our country and correctly evaluate the current situation and the problems of the future.

Footnotes

1. "Statisticheskiye materialy po voprosu o potreblenii myasa v Rossiyiskoy imperii" [Statistical Materials on the Question of Meat Consumption in the Russian Empire], Petrograd, 1915.
2. Kabo, Ye., "Pitanie russkogo rabochego do i posle voyny" [Nutrition of the Russian Worker Before and After the War], Moscow, 1926, p 35.
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